



THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

The United States Through Foreign Eyes

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Current History

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February, 1957

United States Foreign Policy

March, 1957

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From nations all over the world friends and strangers have come to us, to the United States, to study, to visit, to live, to comment and criticize. As a new nation with a republican concept of government and a revolutionary tradition, we were alternately deprecated and distrusted; as the most powerful and prosperous nation in the world, we are often feared and envied. Aware of this, it was with some hesitation that we invited scholars abroad to hold up a looking glass for us, that we might see ourselves as others see us in the second half of the twentieth century. Here is our reflection—here, in eight careful, observant studies, are thumbnail sketches of a country familiar and yet strange to us. Our friends remember with a sense of kinship our revolutionary tradition; they respect our dynamism; our technical, material and social progress. They read with us the great American classics—in Russia as well as in Britain and in India. On the whole readers will find that kindness and a sense of kinship color the image of America in the world's eyes.

Our Coca Cola Culture: An Indian View

BY M. V. KAMATH

Special Correspondent, Press Trust of India, Ltd.

IT WOULD be presumptuous on the part of an Indian—any Indian—to claim to know the minds of the rest of his countrymen. In the first place, India lives in different levels, not the least, the great submerged level of millions of illiterate people to whom America signifies nothing, not even a name. In the second place, generalising over peoples' attitudes is at best an exercise in guesswork, at worst a foolhardy venture. To write, therefore, of how India views America is to sail into uncharted seas.

This introduction is necessary since the writer is deeply conscious of different segments of Indian society with their different social backgrounds, different religious beliefs and different educational attainments. He is also conscious that there are different Americas; one's understanding and apprecia-

tion of the United States depends largely upon how significant one's contacts are with different elements that constitute America's national life and culture.

There is, besides, yet another aspect of the problem that needs to be considered. In speaking about how the United States looks to the people of India, should one take into consideration only the immediate present, or the past as well? India's contacts with the United States, interestingly, are not of long duration. Of the nations of the East, the United States has known and had dealings mostly with China and Japan. India was outside America's trade routes and besides, there seemed to have been a tacit understanding between the western nations not to poach on each other's preserves.

Certainly, the United Kingdom could not

have looked with particular favour upon American cultural invasion of what it considered its own domain. Significantly, while Indian school and college curricula laid stress on British history and literature, Indian students knew almost next to nothing of what the best American minds thought, a state of affairs for which they could hardly be blamed. If Indians read Emerson and Thoreau, Mark Twain and Washington Irving, it was because even British educators had to acknowledge greatness where acknowledgment was due. It is debatable whether those in charge of India's educational system were greatly enamoured of the thought processes of the New World of which they were probably more than a little suspicious.

Iron Curtains are not a latter-day invention: they existed long before Mr. Winston Churchill discovered one in Europe. The curtain that was tightly drawn round India by Sir Winston's predecessors and contemporaries was one reason why the process of Indo-American understanding is now both painful and slow.

Broadly speaking one can consider Indo-American relations as falling into three main periods: pre-war, war and post-war.

Pre-war Impressions

In point of interest the first of these periods is most significant, because much of what India thinks is coloured inevitably by the past. Pre-war India was in essence colonial India, preoccupied with its struggle for freedom, looking outside not only for friends, but for inspiration. When the Swami Vivekananda visited the United States in the 1890's, to participate in the Parliament of Religions held at Chicago, it was as "brothers and sisters of America" that he addressed his audience. And well he might have, for American democracy, fashioned in the mould of universal brotherhood, responded to his message of equality. And it was not inconsiderable American financial support which enabled Swami Vivekananda to establish and successfully work the Ramakrishna Mission, so greatly honoured and revered in India.

Then, as in the first two decades of the

twentieth century, America was the land of Hope and Glory. Young Indian patriots sojourned here in the somewhat extravagant hope of liberating their country from without. Most older Indians will recount the story of the first band of the countrymen to sail for the United States in the "komagataru" in the hope of building up support for the cause of Indian freedom in America. These are incidents in history; they serve to emphasize the point that it was instinctively to America that early Indian patriots turned in their struggle for independence.

But if there was any support growing for India, a bright young American writer, possibly at the earnest prodding of transatlantic friends, did her best to sabotage it. Katherine Mayo's book "Mother India," one of the earliest American works on the vast sub-continent, perhaps wrought more damage to the cause of Indo-American relations than any other book or utterance in recent times. Perhaps it was specifically designed to effect that damage; at any rate, it hit India like a bolt from the blue and for the next few years served to sow the seeds of suspicion and mistrust of American writers.

Katherine Mayo spat at India's spiritual heritage and laughed at its superstitions. India, hurt to the quick, hit back by decrying America's so-called "materialism" and preoccupation with the immediate business of turning out an honest dollar.

That book was a needless adventure into tourist literature; ingrained in the minds of many Indians are memories hard to eradicate; a whole generation brought up to react emotionally to America on memories of that book is a phenomenon worth recording.

But contacts between India and the United States were growing along other lines. The film industry, for one, was serving to bring the two countries closer together. It would perhaps be no exaggeration to say that India's urban population, and in a sense its elite, was brought up as most Americans no doubt were to the antics of Charlie Chaplin and the histrionics of the Barrymores. Many educators and diplomats have regretted the fact that it was given to Hollywood to portray the United States in its own terms of glamour and tinsel. In the peculiar context prevailing in those days that was perhaps in-

evitable; the fact remains and must be taken into consideration.

Other means of contact were few and far between. American education, for example, found little favour in India. American college degrees were no passport either to Government service or social eminence. True, American engineers had helped build India's rising steel industry, but that was despite British frowns. Few Indian students looked to the great American technical institutions like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology or the California Institute of Technology as they were to do a few years later.

As of 1939, Indo-American relations were largely confined to a few business contacts, some spurious Yoga cultists and, in reverse, to the celluloid glamour of Marlene Dietrich, Greta Garbo and Joan Crawford.

The Second World War wrought deep changes in international relations. After years of intellectual and emotional separation, the United States and India were at the threshold of a new relationship. The fact that India was still under British domination was a matter of genuine concern to many responsible Americans and when the "Four Freedoms" were enunciated, at least President Roosevelt was willing to concede that they should apply to India too. That President Roosevelt pleaded for Indian freedom while Winston Churchill stubbornly refused to "preside over the liquidation of the British Empire" are facts too well known to merit repetition. Few Americans realise that aside from Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln, the American most loved and honoured in India is Franklin D. Roosevelt. These events are the direct outcome of World War II, when the United States suddenly discovered that it had been called upon to bear the burden of fighting Democracy's urgent call in countries far and wide, including India.

War-Time Experience

A special chapter could be written about the strange contrast between the American G.I. and the British soldier. The latter came to India to defend his interests: by and large, his attitude towards the Indian was that of the Master. Rarely did he bend.

But the G.I. suffered from no such delu-

sions. An Indian, to him, was a friend and a fellow-citizen of the world, aspiring for freedom from colonial domination. This friendly warmth towards India's national aspirations was a notable feature of Americans in India. Mr. Roosevelt's personal representative, Mr. Roy Henderson, reportedly made little effort to hide his feelings; nor did the thousands of American soldiers stationed for varying periods in India during the years of national frustration when the country's acknowledged leaders from Gandhi downwards were confined in jails. The war years and the years almost immediately following Independence were the Golden Years of Indo-American relations. During that brief period, India and America came closest to each other, in understanding hopes and a desire to translate those hopes into reality.

It is unfortunate that there is no serious and full-length study of Indo-American relations in that brief, all-too-brief period. If pre-war India seemed distant to most Americans—and who can blame them?—the India of the war years was part and parcel of the lives of thousands from Oregon to Florida who had been transplanted from their homes to a completely different world of social and political inequalities so glaring that it hurt. But it was a rich experience to both peoples: to Americans it was something of an experience to see the workings of colonialism at close quarters. To Indians it was something of an experience to feel the warmth of a white man's affection. That the interests of many Americans were sustained was proved later when, during the crucial years of famine, they sent food parcels to India, unasked and unsolicited.

But much more real interest it seemed, centered round India's struggle for freedom. During the days of India's struggle for independence, the United States saw in Mahatma Gandhi the true Liberator, cast in the mould of Washington and Lincoln. Still interest in India was confined to a relatively small group of people. As independence drew closer, a higher calibre of writers and journalists came on the scene, writers of the calibre of Louis Fischer and Vincent Shean, to mention only a few names, to whose clear-sightedness and intuitive understanding

India owes a great deal. This high level interest in India was appreciated; when in due course India became free and the United States was one of the first to recognise that freedom, no country could have stood higher in any Indian's estimates.

Chester Bowles, the American Ambassador who will probably be remembered longer than most officials, had a comparatively easy job set for him. It is frequently said that Mr. Bowles did a marvellous job of public relations in India—which is true enough. What he really did was to make American informality, American friendliness and American generosity come to life. In other words, he gave flesh and blood to what to most Indians was merely a concept. Mr. Bowles was a force for good—and refreshingly so. He evidently grasped the complexities of the Indian scene and reacted to them with a flexibility that took everything in its stride.

What, then, were the contributory causes of the deterioration of Indo-American relations when every sign was propitious for a steady and growing friendship between the two countries? The answer is simple enough. Briefly stated, they were the Kashmir issue and the tensions of the Cold War. But already there were factors awaiting exploitation.

One such was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why, some Indians were asking of themselves and sometimes of friendly Americans, were the atomic bombs dropped on an Asian country and not on Nazi Germany? Were Asian lives expendable? Then, as the United States was girding its loins to oppose Stalin's Russia and all that it meant, and seemed aggressively to invite all other nations to line up behind it, Indians were again asking whether these were the very same Americans they knew who once stood four square by India's freedom struggle.

Deteriorating Relations

Here was a tragic misunderstanding. India, just free and proud of its freedom, was in no mood to be told to stand up and be counted. India's understanding of the international political scene was different. The United States, just confronted with what it considered an international menace in com-

munism and concerned with the immediate job of organising defence, completely failed to appreciate the temper and climate of Indian opinion.

There were accusations and counter-accusations, personalities were as much involved as principles and when the Kashmir issue was drawn into this maelstrom—as it certainly was—the dry emotional tinder had been set on flame. How could Americans, Indians asked, not see the fairness of their cause? How could the United States, Indians asked, so friendly to them before, now supply arms and ammunition to Pakistan which had sworn to fight for Kashmir? And Americans asked: how could Indians in whom they had built so much faith, seem to give aid and comfort to the Communists? How could Indians remain "neutral" in what was so obviously a battle between Good and Evil, Right and Wrong?

What happened is that India's pragmatic mind which is willing to invest in time was confronted with America's legalistic mind which is willing to invest in money. Both countries, it would seem, failed to appreciate the wisdom inherent in each approach. It is a moot point whether John Foster Dulles really meant to support Portuguese colonialism in Goa. The *Times* of India, normally conservative in its appraisal of personalities, editorially commented that even a village idiot could have done better than Mr. Dulles in this matter. Whatever his purpose, his legalistic mind failed to respond to the emotions of the age; it is his mechanistic approach to world problems that has, perhaps, contributed to some extent to increasing Indo-American tensions.

But are the tensions of a lasting character? Judging by the free interchange of people and ideas between the two nations, one can only conclude that these tensions are of the moment. Take away the major irritants and let there be a thawing of the Cold War and the inherent affinities between the two peoples should once again manifest themselves. Minor irritations will no doubt remain: it would be too much to ask that attitudes and behaviour patterns change overnight.

But where now the tendency is to condemn American capitalism out of hand; there

will be at least an effort made to understand the historical roots of that capitalism. Presently the American presents a picture of arrogance, smash-and-grab and bullying that is a caricature of the true America. But the average Indian will refuse to see America in any other light so long as the major irritants continue to plague him.

It is one of the more amusing paradoxes of life that the Indian Communist should seek to portray Americans as "materialistic" when the entire Communist philosophy is based on the doctrine of materialism. It is much more incongruous for a section of Indians to picture Americans as "materialistic" when the very tone and texture of India's Five Year plans are "materialistic." But when emotions are stirred it is the heart that takes over, not the mind. Americans little realise how deeply they have stirred emotions in India by insisting that India line up behind the United States and by taking a "neutral" stand on the Kashmir issue. This is why Indians talk not of the Supreme Court decision on segregation, but of the Alabama bus dispute, not of the finer works of art but of the pulp literature, not of the mechanical and technical wonders but of the chewing gum-coca cola aspects of American civilisation, to the echoes of derisive laughter.

And yet this would be an unbalanced picture of the reaction of the average person, who decides his day's pet hatreds on the headlines in the morning papers. In any reckoning of attitudes, one has also to account for the opinions of the intelligentsia, howsoever small a minority. No one has polled them yet, which is a pity. But a significant segment of Indian opinion has also a picture of an expanding America, which is the melting pot of multiple races, of an America which is still rich in opportunities and to the extent of its richness anxious for Free Enterprise and determined to keep it so, of an America because of its very newness and heterogeneity subject to fears and complexes that need to be understood.

A Composite Picture

It is possible to draw a composite picture of the United States in terms of a series of

objects, each distinctive of the nation. If one were to adopt a "stream of consciousness" technique, one would probably think of America in the following terms: *the automobile, the highways and throughways and the expanding mileage of cement roads; toll gates and parking meters; white steeples and red barns and rolling countryside; skyscrapers and apartment buildings; the lonely crowd and the psychiatrist; racial minorities, negro lynching, country club snobbery; New England puritanism and lax morals; Dr. Kinsey; Marilyn Monroe and Hollywood glamour; Joe Louis and Paul Robeson; McCarthyism and William Knowland; the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Caltech; the Ivy League colleges; crew cut; coca cola and the honky tonk; Pearl Buck and the medical missionary; Wall Street and Republicanism; the New Deal and the Tennessee Valley Authority; Trans World Airlines, super Constellations and jet fighters; the New York Times and the Book-of-the-Month Club; Reader's Digest; installation buying and television; gangsterdom and lawlessness; Justice Holmes and Brandeis University; Fitzpatrick and Herblock and the Pulitzer Prize; Walt Disney and Lil' Abner; Marshall Aid and CARE parcels; the Wild West and Zane Grey; cowboys and oil boom; Sinclair Lewis and Chicago meatpackers; Main Street; Upton Sinclair, Alexander Woollcott, Thoreau, Walden Pond, the Unitarian Church, the Mormons and Salt Lake City; Uncle Tom's Cabin, Abraham Lincoln and Booker T. Washington; From Log Cabin to White House; Huckleberry Finn, Horatio Alger, Henry Ford, Thomas Alva Edison; the Atom Bomb, Oppenheimer, Albert Einstein, Colonel Lindbergh; the Cult of the Big and the Cult of Culture; Madison Avenue and chlorophyll tooth paste; Mr. Cecil de Mille . . . and so on.*

Each of these is a symbol of a state of mind with which many Indians would identify America. Watching American films Indians would ask: are all Americans rich, rushing around in automobiles and generally enjoying the good things of life, making the enjoyment of life the omega of all aspirations? Reading Dr. Kinsey they would ask: Are Americans a free-living people?

The picture of America comes to India

through a number of channels; the picture, therefore, is necessarily confused, unintegrated and blurred, for it takes more than an educated mind to sharpen the image as on a television screen. The newspapers portray a politically powerful America going forth to meet the Communists in battle around a conference table or among the hills and valleys of Korea; the Hollywood films portray a materially rich America of often unsound morals and dubious character; the pulp literature portrays an America that is sustained in violence, passion and power. "From Here to Eternity" has been read with as much avidity in India as Stanley Gardner's works or "Gone With the Wind" of another era. And if one were to ask the average Indian what he knows about distinctly American music, he is most likely to identify it with hot jazz.

By and large the portrait of America in the average mind is anything but flattering. To many Indians, American culture is two dimensional; it has length and breadth, but it lacks depth. This tedious observation can be heard *ad nauseum* in the course of any discussion about American mores. "Lack of depth" is probably one of the commonest expressions used in describing American culture.

The writer remembers once polling a group of high school Indian students on their knowledge of America. Many of them had seen Hollywood films; most were familiar with cartoon strips; few had read even cursorily of American literature though the American invasion of the soft cover market is fairly widespread (among many English textbooks there may be an occasional selection of an American writer or poet, but this is rare); fewer still had met any American in person.

Some of the questions that the students addressed to him were: is there coeducation in American schools? is it true that dating and kissing are common among high school students? is it true that every family owns a car and even girls drive them? why is cricket not a popular game?

To most of them America was a "rich country," a country of gadgets, mechanical aids, push-button efficiency, motor cars, refrigerators, canned goods, but no one ever

equated America with religion, "spiritualism" and the like. America was a friendly country of "easy-going" people where women cut their hair short and men cut it shorter. Some of the things they did not understand included why women should wear trousers ever, why there were so many divorces in America, why families were separated (in India the joint family system, though dying, still persists and in the minds of men is still very much alive) and why Americans are so deeply concerned with communism.

Another question that was asked with both wonderment and credulity was: is it true that students in America can study and earn their way through college? How is it possible? Are American educational standards lower than Indian standards: else how can a student manage to do justice both to his job and his studies? An American making his leisurely way through the towns and villages of India will no doubt come across many more questions of this kind.

Ignorance of the outside world is not a capitalist monopoly. It is our common heritage. But America has made an impact on Indian life that cannot but have its repercussions. Though many may not realise it, the doctors who prescribe medicines probably prescribe American drugs. Eli Lilly and Parke Davis are just as well-known as Yale and Harvard. India's fine chemical industry is still young and its pharmaceutical trade is mostly—apart from the United Kingdom—with the United States, Germany and Switzerland.

The greatest foreign penetration in India is in the realm of drugs. If only the drug manufacturers knew the significance of their own role as representatives of their country, they would do a better job of cementing Indo-American relations than hitherto. Between the drug manufacturer and the salesman of Firestone tires, they have a big job lined up for them. Even the illiterate villager is familiar with a General Motors truck, the all-purpose jeep and a General Electric radio.

India looks at America through various people: the film star, the exchange student, the visiting tourists, the traveling salesman; the government representative, the missionary doctor.

India looks at America through various objects: the automobile, the aeroplane, the drugs in the store, coca cola (this has become quite a popular beverage, at least in many cities), *Life*, *Time*, and *True* magazines, the film, the various aids to better living like the radio, the refrigerator and neon lights.

India looks at America through the ideas it currently represents: anti-communism, the burning of books, the Marshall Plan, E.C.A., SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, Community Development Projects, mass production.

The emerging picture of America is necessarily not clear. No single dominating influence pervades; this is one reason why Indo-American relations are so fluid and fluctuating. But this may be safely said: India looks at America with no hostile feelings. The prevailing feeling can best be summed up thus: that if only America would live up to her own heritage and think less of supporting erstwhile Western allies like Britain and France in their adventures in Cyprus, Algeria and Suez and more in terms of everlasting values, she would be closer to the picture that India once had of America.

Indeed, the growing bonds between the two countries on a higher level were well summed up recently in a letter to *The New York Times*. The writer, Mr. Sachin Sen, editor of the *Indian Nation*, a well-known newspaper in north India, commenting on the visit of Mr. Earl Warren to India said:

We students of political science in India cannot forget the contributions of Justice Holmes, Jus-

tice Cardozo and others. . . . American jurisprudence has the greatest appeal to free India. The judgments of the Supreme Court of India carry the most effective evidence of this new, growing bond between India and America.

In his letter, Mr. Sen pointed out that the constitution of India was a compromise between the parliamentary supremacy in England and the supremacy of the Supreme Court in the United States. Mr. Warren himself, in his observations at Calcutta, pointed out that if the Supreme Court judges in India leaned on the United States Supreme Court decisions, the United States Supreme Court has not hesitated to quote from Indian Supreme Court judgments. This reciprocity, he implied, was going to bind India and America more intimately, a factor necessary to note in these days when so much is written—and with so little appreciation of facts—about the deterioration in Indo-American relations.

M. V. Kamath, a graduate of the University of Bombay, was a chemist, a school teacher, and a social worker before turning to journalism ten years ago. He was editor of *The Free Press Bulletin*, an evening paper published in Bombay, from 1950-1955. Mr. Kamath, who has toured the United States, the world, and most of the Indian states, frequently broadcasts news commentaries from the All India Radio.



" . . . There are still to be found visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord."

—Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist Papers*, No. 6, 1787.

"Soviet people would like not 'competitive coexistence' but coexistence based on friendship and cooperation," notes this author, pointing out that the "Soviet people have a large reserve of good will towards Americans. We should like to be friends with the Americans, but friendship cannot be one-sided; it is possible only on a mutual basis."

Our Friendly Potential: A Russian View

BY BORIS R. IZAKOV

Former Editor, International Affairs

ABOUT A YEAR ago I toured the United States with a group of Soviet journalists. In America we were literally bombarded with questions about the Soviet Union and Soviet people. And on our return to Moscow every one of us was flooded with requests to describe our trip. We were invited to speak at schools and clubs, newspapers and factories and of course at private homes. We saw for ourselves that Americans are keenly interested in the lives of Soviet people and Soviet people in the lives of Americans.

This mutual interest has, it seems to me, deep roots. The American and Soviet people have much in common, more than we sometimes realize. I refer not only to the vast expanses and rich natural resources of both our countries, which cover the breadth of whole continents, but also to certain traits of character, such as energy and purposefulness, cheerfulness and optimism, friendliness and hospitality, which link our peoples.

Throughout history our peoples have been friends. Russians always followed

American developments with close attention. Russia's finest men fervently greeted America's fight for independence. Our poets sang of it in their poems. During the Civil War in America a Russian of advanced ideas, Colonel Ivan (John) Turchin, fought in the Northern Army, rising to the rank of general there. And William Henry Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State, said at the time: "She [Russia] has our friendship, in every case, in preference to any other European power, simply because she always wishes us well, and leaves us to conduct our affairs as we think best."¹ These words, by the way, are, in my opinion, an excellent formula for the coexistence of states and nations—mutual good will and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. . . . But more about that below.

Unfortunately, similarity of national character and historical tradition do not alone determine the relations between nations. Such relations are sometimes exceedingly complex. So are the relations between the Soviet and American peoples. And although it is no easy task, I shall try to give as exact an answer as possible to your magazine's question as to how Soviet people look at America.

But you might, quite justifiably, ask at the very beginning: How do Soviet people know about America? Where do they get their ideas about America in general? The reply is: Soviet people form their judgment

Boris R. Izakov is a writer and journalist and former editor of International Affairs, a monthly journal published in Moscow. He is the Vice-President of the Union of Soviet Writers' Foreign Committee. Former London correspondent for Pravda, Mr. Izakov was a major in the Soviet Army during World War II.

¹ Quotation from *America Faces Russia*, by Thomas Bailey, Cornell University Press, New York, 1950, p. 70.

of your country mainly from the great works of American literature. People read a great deal in our country, primarily fiction. There are many distinguished American writers whose works have been published here in millions—yes, millions—of copies. They include Fenimore Cooper, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Mark Twain, Walt Whitman, Jack London, O. Henry, Theodore Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, Ernest Hemingway, Upton Sinclair, John Steinbeck, Howard Fast and others. In the homes of many of my countrymen books by these authors stand side by side with the works of Pushkin, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Gorky. And since English is taught widely in Soviet schools, many of my countrymen can read American authors in the original.

"There is nothing in the world stronger . . . and weaker than words!" said the famous Russian writer Ivan Turgenev. The word of a gifted writer is always strong. Your distinguished works of literature possess great power. They are envoys, as it were, representing the American people abroad, and representing them in the best light. Because of such works we have come to regard the American people with respect and sincere liking.

I should like to point out that even at the height of the cold war there was no let-up in the publication of works by American writers in the Russian language. Plays by American dramatists—Lillian Hellman, Arthur Miller and others—never left the Soviet stage. And from information that has come my way, I know that our publishing houses are planning to put out still more American literary works and our theatres would like to produce still more American plays.

However, it is not only from books, the theatre and the films that Soviet people know America and Americans. Soviet and American people were comrades-in-arms in the recent war, fighting shoulder to shoulder against the greatest danger to threaten civilization in our age. I recall a frosty day on the shores of ice-covered Lake Ilmen, south of Leningrad. It was December 8, 1941, the day after Japan's treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor. "For Pearl Harbor, against the fascist aggressors—fire!" snapped a young lieutenant in command of an artillery bat-

tery, camouflaged by fir branches. And shells whistled above the snow-topped trees to come down over there, on Nazi positions.

Later, on the Elbe, we shook hands with our American allies and looked into their eyes. We shared the joy of victory with them. One does not forget such things.

And today, too, we meet quite a few Americans, visiting our country individually or in groups. Among the American tourists in Moscow are students and businessmen, teachers of Russian and political personalities. The American farmers' delegation who visited many of our collective farms met with a friendly welcome everywhere they went. Wide acclaim marked the performance of "Porgy and Bess" and the concerts of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, which showed Soviet audiences samples of American theatrical and musical culture.

Many Soviet people have dealt with American machines, especially in the years when we had not yet learned to produce the most complex equipment ourselves, as we do now. Soviet scientists and scholars meet American colleagues at international conferences and establish mutually useful contacts with them. In the Soviet Union we have a high opinion of American science and engineering.

Unfriendly American Policy

It would, however, be insincere on my part to describe the attitude of Soviet people to America and Americans in nothing but rosy colours. Before sitting down to this article I discussed the subject with many of my countrymen in Moscow and in the village near Moscow where I spend my weekends. Some of the people I spoke with criticized various aspects of American life. The gist of their opinions is, though, that the American way of life is the affair of the Americans themselves but there are certain criticisms to be made in the field of American policy which to a certain extent affects other nations since we all live in one world—that is, foreign policy. That, in my opinion, is a reasonable position and I shall keep within its framework.

In his memoirs Winston Churchill quotes Franklin D. Roosevelt concerning a curious incident dating back to the time when the

United States Government did not recognize the U.S.S.R. It seems that during a visit to an American school Mrs. Roosevelt noticed a large blank space on a map hanging in the classroom. On asking what it meant she was told that mention of that place was forbidden. That terrible place was the Soviet Union.²

This episode took place in 1933, 16 years after the establishment of Soviet government in Russia! Certain influential people in the United States do not like the new system established in our country by will of the overwhelming majority of the population. At first they tried to overthrow it by means of armed force—permit me to remind the reader of the period of intervention when American troops were stationed in Siberia—later they consoled themselves with wiping our country off the geography map, and now they make speeches about “liberation.”

“Liberation”

There are people in America who wish to “liberate” us from Socialism. But we like the Socialist system under which private individuals cannot grow rich at the expense of other people's labor, where profit-seeking is impossible and monopolies cannot influence the country's destiny. The Socialist system enabled us to transform Russia in a short time from a backward and poor land, where the great majority of the population lived in terrible poverty, wore bast shoes, were illiterate and were cut down by epidemics—into an advanced industrial and agricultural power.

The Socialist state guarantees every man and woman education, employment and a decent old-age pension. We know well that no other system could have ensured our country such economic and cultural advancement and we believe that Socialism has demonstrated its advantages in practice in our country. Naturally, to build up a new social system is no easy task, and to do so without making mistakes is hardly possible. But having lived under Socialism, our people certainly do not want another system. We do not want to be “liberated.”

² Winston S. Churchill. *The Second World War. Triumph and Tragedy*. Boston, 1953, 1953, p. 391.

The same may be said for the peoples of China and a number of other countries of Eastern Europe and Asia who have chosen the Socialist path of development. They too wish to conduct their affairs as they see fit and they too cannot understand why certain influential people in America wish to foist their way of life on them.

Take China. Any unprejudiced observer of China today will confirm that for the first time in long, long years the country has an honest government which has put an end to feudal internecine warfare, which has done away with corruption in government institutions and is carrying out great reforms for the purpose of improving the lot of the plain people. Yet the United States obstinately refuses to recognize this government, and supports Chiang Kai-shek and his group on Formosa, thereby giving rise to most dangerous tension in a vital region. As a result of United States opposition a country with a population of 600 million is denied its lawful seat in the United Nations, a factor that complicates and aggravates the international situation to no little extent.

I beg the American reader's pardon for my frankness, but Soviet people do not like the attempts of influential American groups to foist the American way of life on other peoples. Such attempts evoke nothing but irritation and lead to relapses of the cold war. Besides, every student of history knows that never have efforts from the outside been successful in resurrecting an obsolete social regime in a large country.

Non-Interference

Frankly speaking, we had least of all expected such attempts on the part of America. After all, the United States of America came into being as the result of national revolution and of war caused by those who wished to impose an obsolete regime on the American people. The men who laid the foundations of the American state proclaimed non-interference in the affairs of others a cornerstone of foreign policy. No wonder people are surprised at the changes undergone by American foreign policy in our days.

If in the 1930's Mrs. Roosevelt was

amazed to see a geographical map with a large blank space in place of the U.S.S.R., today we Soviet people are no less amazed by some of the geographical maps so frequently published in the American press. I am referring to the maps denoting American military bases scattered on the approaches to our frontiers with arrows usually indicating the distance from each base to key centers of the Soviet Union. Sometimes the distance is given in miles, sometimes in flight hours. That doesn't alter the matter. Military bases frequently figure in the speeches of leading Americans, too, along with talk about armaments, military groupings and "positions of strength."

Permit me to cite some of the questions most frequently put to me by audiences after hearing my talks about the trip.

"Why are so many threatening speeches uttered against us in America?"

"Why do high government officials in the United States consider it possible to interfere in our affairs by talking about 'liberation'?"

"Why do the Americans encircle us with military bases?"

Like many other people, I feel that a war between great powers in our day would bring unthinkable disaster to mankind. This is frequently admitted in speeches by American leaders. One would think that a number of serious conclusions with regard to foreign policy would necessarily follow.

Everything indicates that we have entered a long period of coexistence between states with different social systems. But coexistence may be based on good relations and cooperation between states, and it may be something quite different. Cyrus Sulzberger, writing in *The New York Times*, says that in the opinion of Dulles and the State Department coexistence is possible "but always on a limited and provisional basis," and developing this concept he refers to "competitive coexistence," "... a dynamic condition in which ideological, economic and political systems seek to dominate each other by means short of war." Furthermore, Sulzberger notes that in Dulles' opinion U. S. plans still include the "liberation" of the Poles and Czechs.³

Such a concept of "coexistence" is, we feel, pregnant with the possibility of conflicts and therefore dangerous. This sort of "coexistence" does not preclude subversive activities in other countries. On the contrary, it presumes them. It does not preclude but presumes an armaments race and war preparations.

Friendly Cabbages

In his articles Cyrus Sulzberger wrote that the State Department's conception of coexistence does not mean "a static life like that of two cabbages in a field." As for me, I should prefer the coexistence of two cabbages in a field—at least they don't interfere in each other's affairs and don't come to blows.

Soviet people would like not "competitive coexistence" but coexistence based on friendship and cooperation. Soviet people have a large reserve of good will towards Americans. We should like to be friends with the Americans, but friendship cannot be one-sided; it is possible only on a mutual basis.

We feel that cooperation would be advantageous to both our peoples. Discarding all conceit, we must admit that there is much we can learn from each other. It was Disraeli who said that every man has a right to be conceited until he is successful. Surely, both the American and the Soviet people lost that right long ago.

Soviet people willingly listen to criticism from the outside. Mr. J. Jacobs, of Arizona, recently visited our country as a member of the American farmers' delegation. When he returned home he published notes about his trip, notes which, along with appreciation of our best achievements, include serious criticism as well. It may interest you to learn that *Ogonyok*, a Moscow magazine with a circulation of a million copies, has printed Mr. Jacobs' notes.

Americans, too, can gain from cooperation with the Soviet Union. Take, for instance, the papers delivered by Soviet scientists at last year's conference in Geneva on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This conference showed clearly enough that in cooperation along such lines the Soviet Union has as much to offer as to receive. Let me also

³ *New York Times*, October 30 and November 1, 1954.

mention the first atomic powered electric station in the world built in the Soviet Union and the much-publicized story of the turbine drills.

I recently read an article in *The New York Times*—the issue for August 5, this year, to be exact—on higher education in the United States and in the U.S.S.R. The article pointed out that the number of graduates from higher educational establishments in 1955 was 59,000 in the United States and 126,000 in the U.S.S.R.—twice as many. It called for a wider program of higher education in the United States and suggested the introduction of a number of new features, for instance, state stipends for students (as is the case in the Soviet Union). Indeed, it will not be at all bad if our mutual experience goads us forward in various fields of life.

That is the kind of coexistence based on cooperation we should like. And the warm and cordial welcome we Soviet journalists received in the United States a year ago makes me feel sure that coexistence based on cooperation would suit many Americans too.

Naturally, some people would have to give up their obsolete ideas and views, ideas and views produced by the cold war, by the atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. In this connection permit me to relate the following incident. We were accompanied on our travels through the United States by Mr. Frank Kluckhohn, ex-journalist and now a public relations man, invited for that job by the State Department. Mr. Kluckhohn made a good impression on us. Conservative in his views, he was invariably attentive to us, trying to show us his country and the American way of life in the best light. On our return to the Soviet Union we wrote and spoke of Mr. Kluckhohn in the friendliest terms.

But then in the May issue of *Reader's Digest* we read an article by Mr. Kluckhohn which afforded us much amusement. It seems that Mr. Kluckhohn considers us mysterious and formidable persons who came to the United States with sinister aims. Even the innocent habit of some of us of carrying pictures of our wives and children

on long voyages seemed to Mr. Kluckhohn part of a plot. He thought it suspicious, you see, that our wives and children were good looking and he hinted that they were not really our wives and children at all. After that there was nothing to do but show our wives and children to some visiting Americans.

The members of our group wrote a letter on this matter to the editors of *Reader's Digest*. We felt that our letter ought to be printed if only because Mr. Kluckhohn, probably due to lack of information, we should like to think, had declared that in our dispatches about America we had written things we never wrote. Our letter, however, was not published.

This entire episode smacks of the old suspicion and mistrust which, fortunately, is becoming a thing of the past. I am convinced that in the Soviet Union such a thing could not have occurred.

Soviet people are confidently taking the path of widening and extending contacts and exchange, of cooperation with the West. The reluctance shown in this respect by some people in America is entirely alien to us.

Regrettably, the United States has not yet created conditions as favourable for Soviet visitors as we have created for American visitors. Then, again, take the question of the translation and publication of works by contemporary Soviet authors in the United States. As a writer and translator who has translated a number of modern American and British literary works into Russian, I should like to see Soviet novels, stories, poems and plays translated and printed in America. By doing almost nothing in this respect you deprive yourselves of the opportunity of learning about Soviet life first-hand, so to speak.

Soviet people sincerely want the relations between our countries to be built on a healthy foundation. Surely, it is high time to return to William Seward's formula—to wish one another well and leave each other to conduct his affairs as he thinks best.

For my part I firmly believe that our two great nations will arrive at this.

"Anti-Americanism from all sources whatever has absolutely no importance in Britain compared with the perfectly clear realisation through all sections of politically conscious society that our fate as a nation is bound up with America's, and the deeper instinctive feeling all through our people that in the fearful dangers of an atomic age the English-speaking peoples throughout the world are one: they stand and fall together."

Our Anglo-Saxon Legacy: A British View

By A. L. ROWSE

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AMERICA is, and has been for a long time, the chief external experience of the British people. I use the word 'external' simply to mean coming from outside geographically; for just as Americans are not foreigners in Britain, so the impact of America over many generations has entered intimately into the veins of the British, not only into their conscious experience but—what is far more subtle and exciting—into their unconscious life.

We all have heard of English influences upon America, upon political institutions and practice, or upon literature, for example. And many people are aware of external American influences upon modern English life—in technical matters, the cinema, television, newspapers, domestic conveniences and so on. But few people realize how much more deeply and naturally the American experience is a part of our experience, has

entered into our bloodstream and our very folklore. It takes some imagination to realise the extent of it, so closely interwoven it is into the very fabric of life for us. It has been so for a very long time really; after all, blood is thicker than water. There is a magnificent book on this theme waiting to be written some day; but it will take some doing, and it should be tackled from our end. (It would make some small return for the finest, and most perceptive, things about the English, which have always been written by Americans: by Emerson and Hawthorne, Henry James and Santayana, for example.)

Common Experience

We know about the influence of English literature upon American; but few people realise that American literature is intimately a part of our experience, and has been for the last century. When I was a boy at school we all read Fenimore Cooper, *Tom Sawyer* and *Huckleberry Finn*, Mark Twain and Bret Harte and Jack London. In the village in the evenings we all played cowboys and Red Indians; we all knew about the Wild West and Buffalo Bill. Today—it is a common complaint—the younger generation is as much influenced by what comes out of Hollywood. On a more intellectual plane the reputation of some of the great American writers was made first in England, and the genius of some of them, like Poe, Melville, Whitman, was earlier recognised there. American classics are English classics too;

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and some of the most popular—*Uncle Tom's Cabin*, *Little Women*, *Uncle Remus*—have been part of the mental possessions of the English people for the best part of a century.

But this is on the conscious level of experience; it is the unconscious that is more interesting and less realised. The two peoples sing the same hymns in their churches: I well remember the way that was borne in on me, before I had ever visited America, by Thornton Wilder's *Our Town* on an English stage, and the impression it made on me. American revivalists have always had a great response in Britain, from the days of Sankey and Moody (and before) onwards. We are not wanting in examples of it today. And such a fact is of a profounder significance than people realise: it shows that at heart the American and the British response to life itself is much the same, vibrates to the same chords. And I love that.

One could go on and on But only Professor Brogan could do justice to the theme.

A Complex Picture

The image that the British people have of America, and their response to America, varies from class to class, and to some extent geographically. It is well-known how, during the Civil War, the sympathies of the upper classes were on the whole with the South; those of the working class, of the people at large, with the North. Similarly, I cannot help feeling that a part of the country like my own, the West Country, is more intimately in touch with America than, say, Kent or Sussex is. Here, in Cornwall where I am writing, innumerable Cornish families (like my own) are divided on both sides of the Atlantic; there is never a moment when we do not feel in touch, there has been so much coming to and fro since we can remember; America is naturally and easily part of our lives, always there in the background—the friend on the other side. Very much the same would be true for the Irish, and for areas on the western side of Britain facing the Atlantic and looking to America—like Lancashire or the districts round Glasgow or Bristol—rather than eastern counties like Northumberland or Lincolnshire. London, of course, is an excep-

tion: London is very conscious of America, on different levels and in various ways.

These regional divergences are being levelled out, by the presence of American air-bases and personnel in different parts of the country and increasing contacts of every kind. We see that the British picture of America must be a very complex one, not at all easy to sum up or to define very sharply. If it is *too* sharply defined in the snap phrases of journalists it becomes untrue.

Variations over Time

The picture varies not only in space but in time. This is only to be expected. The kind of impression that America made on the outside world when McCarthyism was at its height is a very different matter from the benevolent, kindly impression we derive since Eisenhower turned that corner and took affairs into his own hands. It is not unfair to say that McCarthyism did immense damage to America in the outside world. It played straight into the hands of the Communists and the detractors of America everywhere.

The effect was to be seen in Britain as well as elsewhere; though it was less important here, for there is a far better understanding of America in Britain than in other countries, very little real anti-Americanism for it to take advantage of, and few Communists or fellow-travellers to take advantage of it. There were plenty of English people who understood that this was a temporary phase America was going through, and there were some of us who were able to assure American friends not to lose heart, that things would shortly be better—as they are.

Historians, in particular, should know how these things go up and down in human affairs and that they do not last for ever. Already the damage inflicted by McCarthyism, the disgrace upon the image of America in men's minds, has been repaired and has very largely disappeared.

The present should, then, be a good time for taking soundings, for estimating the normal, long-term opinion of America in Britain.

I insist that there is very little anti-Americanism here; I gather that there is a good deal in some countries, especially in France,

but *not here*. We must not go by the piquant exchanges of politicians on the fringe, of journalists out to sensationalise everything, still less by the grouses of sourpusses among the intellectuals—we want to strike a true balance. We must make a sacrifice of the piquant and the sensational to arrive at the normal and dependable.

We all know where the most irritating anti-Americanism has been found in the last few years—among the Left intellectuals in politics, expressed in the deplorable pages of the *New Statesman*. To take that as in any way representative of the country would be equivalent to taking the *Nation* or the *New Republic* as representative of America. This group is as much anti-British as they are anti-American; indeed they are professional Antis, 'agin' everything, we may say, except sin. It is impossible to take these people seriously. I take more seriously the less vocal opinions of the fellow-travellers in the Trade Unions, for we know that what line Russia takes they will follow—and that does matter.

America's Century

There is bound to be jealousy of whoever is on top in the world, and since the twentieth is America's century she is bound to come in for that as Britain had to put up with it in the nineteenth century. But since Britain knows what this is like from experience, I can honestly claim that there is much less of that than might otherwise have been expected; for another thing, we feel far too much bound up with America's fate to indulge such sentiments.

Where you may hear them expressed is, I fancy, more among the middle class than the people at large. And that may in part reflect the fact that the middle class in Britain has been much harder hit by the economic losses of the war, of investments abroad, by taxation and by the Welfare State from which the working class has undoubtedly gained. One may hear, too, anti-American expressions from lower class lads on the streets, hit by the competition of American service-men with their superior charms (and dollars) for the girls. But what does that amount to? and what importance has it?

Anti-Americanism from all sources whatever has absolutely no importance in Britain compared with the perfectly clear realisation through all sections of politically conscious society that our fate as a nation is bound up with America's, and the deeper instinctive feeling all through our people that in the fearful dangers of an atomic age the English-speaking peoples throughout the world are one: they stand or fall together.

Of course, we want, we need, to muster all the allies we can in the alignment of the world between East and West. The British are not out to offend any potential allies; but I suspect that they not only regard the English-speaking peoples as the heart and core of the Western cause but in their hearts think that they are all we can really rely on. So America is the centre of the picture for us; all else takes second place.

What kind of picture is it that we have of America? How to depict so vast and complex an image? As I have said, if we draw the outlines too sharply it becomes untrue.

At the risk of getting them out of perspective, let me state one difficulty and one or two doubts. For remember always the rock-bottom of the matter is a fundamental and instinctive confidence in America, something taken for granted—perhaps too easily taken for granted. In the dangers of the modern world we have confidence only in ourselves and you—in Britain and the Commonwealth, in the United States: our own kith and kin.

One difficulty is the impossibility of *imagining* the United States: one cannot properly understand unless one goes there. After all, it is not like an ordinary European country that one can get one's mind around; it is more or less a continent. And English people simply cannot conceive of the vastness of the country, the immensity of its spaces and resources, the complexity of its affairs, in particular of its politics, government and institutions. How the United States manages to get governed at all is the standing miracle of democracy; it is also its greatest achievement. But people in Britain can hardly be expected to understand the complications, the difficulties and disappointments involved; sometimes they feel bewildered at some delay imposed, for reasons they do not apprehend, or they feel

left out in the cold with too much of the baby to hold.

I am not saying that they are right, but simply that this is what they occasionally feel in the interstices of the United States' attention, distracted for the moment by some turn in its own affairs—the struggle over the League of Nations, McCarthy or just the frequency of elections. Responsible people in politics understand the difficulties, some of them inherent in a federal constitution, others in the diversity and difficulty of concentrating public opinion over such a vast continental area. Our political leaders are usually content to wait until things right themselves, nowadays with an instinctive confidence that they will come out all right.

One Cannot Imagine America

For us internal politics are much simpler and more direct, so that less time and energy need be spent on them; our troubles are external in the foreign field, and at home, economic. But most Americans can have no idea of the smallness of our resources compared with theirs; that England herself, for example, is only one third the size of California, that Texas alone is four times the size of England.

The remedy is for each of us to become better acquainted with the other. And since there are far more Americans who travel in Britain than British people who can travel in the United States, the more facilities that Americans can provide for intelligent and educated Britons to learn something of America—people who will go back and spread knowledge of America in influential places, in politics and industry, in universities and schools—the better. For, as I have said, no one can imagine America; one cannot do it any sort of justice unless one has been there.

Isolationism

The one thing that would shatter our picture of America would be any doubt about her remaining in the centre of the picture, fully functioning as the leader of the West, fulfilling her responsibilities as the greatest power in the world. Any doubt as to this would shake British confidence to the

foundations, for we know only too well that if the Americans withdrew the Russians would move into the vacuum. That is why the British are so sensitive, perhaps over-apprehensive, about isolationism in the United States. They regard the American withdrawal after the first World War as having left the way open for the Second. They are convinced that the Second would not have happened if the United States had remained *in*, instead of contracting out after Wilson's defeat.

Doubts and Difficulties

Actually, the conduct of American world policy since the war—after the first few months' fumbling in which we were left to hold the breach against Stalin—has given no reason for any want of confidence. From an historian's point of view it is remarkable how quickly the United States in the mid-twentieth century has taken to her role, and faced her responsibilities, as the leading world power. But there are always expressions of opinion, or symptoms, or mere resentments, in the Middle West or Far West that are liable to make us feel unduly apprehensive.

Another doubt, and source of some apprehension, is whether Americans fully understand our anxieties and difficulties over, say, the Middle East, over Persia, Suez, Cyprus. After all, this country cannot live without oil from the Middle East. We are anxious to pay our way, not to be more of a financial and economic liability to the United States than necessary. There has been a feeling over here that American oil-interests in being too helpful to Saudi-Arabia have added greatly to our difficulties in the Near East, provided the means for the incessant anti-British campaigns in the Arab world. Perhaps there is less co-ordination between the oil-interests and responsible American policy than there might be: not the first time that disaccord between sectional interests and state policy in America has added to our difficulties.

At the summit there seems to be entire and absolute confidence. On our side, with Sir Winston Churchill, it was instinctive and profound: he understood in his bones and

to his finger-tips that our fate is indissolubly linked with America's. It was not for nothing that he is half-American; perhaps it gave him an oecumenical point of view from which he saw both sides of the Atlantic as two halves of one world. With his successor, if the understanding is not so instinctive, it is certainly there: a matter of intellectual conviction.

On the British side, there is absolute confidence in Eisenhower. After all, we have fought under him; millions of young Englishmen served under him; he is personally known to many former servicemen. His personality is very familiar to the British public, arousing the same kind of response over here as at home: confidence, respect, a feeling of reliability, a warm liking and affection.

Stevenson's personality is naturally not so well known; but he is esteemed for the man of distinction that he is, and actually in the 1952 Presidential election his candidature was more favoured over here, since his speeches reported much better and came across more effectively in the newspapers.

Truman's is a personality that has made its place in the British consciousness—and a very warm and friendly one, as could be seen from the triumphal reception he got this summer when he came over to receive his honorary degree at Oxford. The British like a gamecock; they like spirit and cheek; after all, in his way Churchill is as much of a *gamin* as Truman—and the internal disagreements of American parties are no concern of ours.

It is perhaps a pity that Dulles' personality does not come across more clearly; we do not have a very definite conception of what kind of man he is. We assume him to be able, and that is all to the good; but his tendency to moralize politics does not arouse much response nowadays. We are apt to be reminded of Calvin Coolidge's "Our charity girdles the whole earth"; that sort of statement does not go down in the outside world: even if true, better not to say it. And Mr. Dulles's contributions in the Suez crisis have not been much appreciated in Britain; they have only added to the confusion and made things more difficult for us.

I have confined myself perhaps too much to politics; but politics are the plane upon which the life of the nation as a whole is projected for all to see it at its most generalised. Those people who see America with the eye of historical understanding see more: they see the United States at a fascinating moment in time, at the apogee of her power—no power in the history of the world that has exercised it more generously or charitably—and poised on the threshold of a great expansion in the life of the spirit.

The nineteenth century saw the epic achievement of the conquest of a continent. It saw the making and welding of the American nation, on the whole the most significant event in modern history. To achieve this in such an astonishingly short time—after all I myself knew an old fellow-Cornishman who was taken out as a baby in arms with the original forty-niners to California—necessarily meant an intense pressure on the spirit. (Life is easier on the spirit in England: more lax, no such strain.) There are all the pressures towards Americanism; there is the Puritan strain so intense in the middle ranges of American society; there is the intolerable pressure towards social conformism—one understands why and the reasons that made it necessary.

But now that the epic achievement is over, the American nation stands forth the most amazing, the most varied and exciting in the world, the American character formed and evident in all its strength and charm to those who know it best (to know it is to love it; not to know it is a deprivation). Has not the time come when it would be better to let up on these pressures? to let the astonishing native energies in the American people have their fling, bring forth all the creativeness they have in them, come to full flower? For I feel that, for the Americans, this is their Elizabethan Age, having emerged triumphant from the struggles of the first half of the century, awakened to self-consciousness and maturity as a people. Like their Elizabethan ancestors after the Spanish Armada—they are poised and ready for no less exciting adventures and fulfillment in the realm of the spirit, of the intellect and the arts.

"American technology and American wealth are so spectacular that the Japanese, like so many other peoples, can see little else and think of American civilization as solely a gadget civilization dominated by materialistic values.

"... The Americans are good-hearted, but they are simple-minded, immature, uncouth, brash, pleasure-mad, and self-centered.

"These stock impressions were little changed, save for minor exceptions, by the young American G.I.'s who swarmed over Japan."

Our Gadget Civilization: A Japanese View

BY KAZUO KAWAI

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ALTHOUGH powerful America naturally commands the attention of all the world, the Japanese have more than ordinary reasons to be particularly interested in Americans and their ways. It was Commodore Matthew C. Perry and the United States Navy which shattered the isolation of Japan in 1853 and propelled her into the society of nations. In the ensuing century of modernization that transformed Japan from a medieval state to a World Power, it was the United States more than any other one Western nation that influenced the course of Japan's progress. When the course of Japan's progress eventually went dangerously astray, it was American armed might that checked and chastized her.

Now, following an unprecedented American military occupation which constituted the most forcible foreign impact in all of Japan's long history, a considerably reformed Japan is bound to the United States as a military ally and serves as the chief bastion

of American influence in the Far East. No wonder the United States is the foreign nation that impinges by far the most prominently on the Japanese consciousness.

How America appears to the Japanese, whose destiny has thus been so vitally shaped by the impact of the United States, should be of concern to Americans, for despite her collapse as a major power, Japan still has a crucial role to play in world affairs. Her strategic location, her industrial power which towers over that of the rest of Asia, her completely literate populace with an abundance of experienced scientists, technicians, and administrators (which no other Asian country can hope to match for probably several generations) and her century of experience as a member of modern world society while most of her neighbors have only recently emerged from colonial dependence, may well enable Japan to hold the balance of power in an Asia poised between competing Communist and Western influences.

The reactions of the Japanese to the overwhelming American influence upon them differ significantly from group to group and from individual to individual. But, in general, there has always been a large measure of genuine and often enthusiastic admiration, liking and gratitude for American contribution and stimulus to Japanese life. At the same time there has also been a considerable measure of apprehension, chagrin

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and bruised self-esteem over the fact that Japan has been so inescapably molded by an America which too frequently seems so ignorant and so indifferent about Japan. The exact proportions of the friendly and the resentful Japanese reactions have fluctuated widely from time to time and can be greatly altered by specific American actions.

At the present time, Japanese views of America are still dominated by the effects of the Occupation. Although a somewhat disturbing anti-American reaction has now set in, a substantial part of the reservoir of goodwill created by the benevolent and constructive Occupation remains. While many of the Occupation-imposed reforms are being sloughed off, it is highly unlikely that the strong democratic orientation given to Japan by the Occupation will entirely disappear. Japan's experiences in war and defeat were too searing; the profound changes they wrought can never be completely undone.

Furthermore the broad trend of Japanese political and social development for the past 100 years has been toward steadily increasing Westernization and democratization, only temporarily interrupted by the militarist reaction of the immediate prewar and wartime years. The American Occupation restored and strengthened this historical long-range trend. As the most modernized and Westernized nation in Asia, Japan has a more practical appreciation—inadequate though it may be—of the Western way of life than most non-Western nations.

Also, as the most highly developed industrial and commercial nation in Asia, Japan has large and powerful business and industrial classes with a vested interest in capitalism and with an innate horror of communism. Even though tempted by dreams of trade with Communist nations, most Japanese realize that their economic welfare depends essentially on continued close cooperation with the United States and the Free World. The underlying Japanese view of America, therefore, is strongly weighted in a friendly direction.

Yet, despite the basically friendly attitude, hypercritical attitudes toward America also exist. Inasmuch as these are the ones that need particularly to be understood if they are to be successfully counteracted, the fol-

lowing discussion will deal mostly with them even at the risk of leaving a somewhat exaggerated impression of their seriousness.

The present relationship of alliance between the United States and Japan itself tends to breed distrust. Benevolent as was the American Occupation, no foreign military occupation can be pleasant for the occupied. The present relationship still reminds the Japanese too much of the recent Occupation. They question whether nations so disparate in power can really be equal partners; they suspect that the present alliance actually represents a continuation of the Occupation in disguise. Frustrated by their relative impotence, they unconsciously seek a salve for their injured self-esteem by occasionally refusing to cooperate with the Americans and by being quick to criticize and condemn supposed American shortcomings.

Not all the Japanese criticisms of America stem from an inferiority complex; there are some rational grounds for legitimate differences of opinion. For example, most Japanese oppose the present American policy of pushing the rapid military build-up of Japan. They fear that, even with substantial American aid, the burden of rearmament would so overtax Japan's precarious economy as to cause social unrest which would only invite the growth of communism from within. Some Japanese also fear that democracy in Japan is still so fragile that even limited rearmament might carry the risk of a revival of militarism. The threat of communism seems to them to be less dangerous than the threat that democracy might be stifled in the effort to combat communism. They are disturbed over what they think is the willingness of some Americans to sacrifice true democracy in favor of militant anti-communism.

Many Japanese also suspect that the United States is so preoccupied with military measures against the Communist threat as to be neglectful of possible political measures to lessen the danger of war. They fear that Japan is being used as a cat's-paw of this unwise American policy, with grave risks to her security. Many believe that the safest course for Japan would be to adhere to strict neutralism and strict pacifism so as

to offer no provocation to anyone. This view is particularly attractive to the many Japanese who, with traumatic memories of their terrifying wartime experience, now recoil unrealistically and even hysterically from any suggestion of rearmament—even for self-defense. To such Japanese, the United States appears to represent entangling alliances, dangerous involvement in power politics and risky military commitments.

Lack of enthusiasm for American connections on the part of some Japanese also derives from the belief that Japan's future lies naturally with Asia rather than with the West. In common with many other Asians, many Japanese regard the struggle between democracy and communism as essentially a civil war between two Occidental ideologies in which Orientals have no direct concern. They therefore feel that Japan should disassociate herself from the United States and identify herself with the Asian nations that are trying to avoid commitment to either side in the Russian-American rivalry. Some would even go so far as to say that Asians, as disinterested third parties, have a moral duty to try to moderate the intolerance of both the Western and the Communist antagonists and to serve as impartial mediators in the interests of the peace of the world.

Japanese apprehensions over American foreign policy also stem from Japan's economic predicament. With limited territory, inadequate natural resources, and a large population whose rapid growth has only recently begun to slow down significantly, Japan can support herself only by extensive foreign trade. But since the war, much of Japan's former market areas and sources of raw materials in continental Asia have become inaccessible, while the potentially important areas of South and Southeast Asia remain difficult to develop. The bulk of Japan's trade has therefore had to be concentrated on the United States. But while Japan buys about \$800 millions of American products—mostly food, fuel, and raw materials—each year, Japan has never succeeded in selling to the United States more than about half of that amount. American resistance to Japanese goods is a cause for dismay on the part of the Japanese.

In the face of this perennial imbalance,

the Japanese are tempted by dreams of trade with Communist China, for China used to account for about one-third of Japan's foreign trade before the war. But here American political pressure prevents Japan from cultivating closer trade relations with Red China. Even though trade with the Communists is actually likely to prove disappointing and dangerous, Japanese resentment will be directed against the United States as long as she will neither buy enough Japanese goods herself nor allow Japan to explore alternative markets in Communist lands.

Pan-Asian neutralism, alluded to earlier, is also a factor in this situation, for a sense of common Asian identity causes most Asians to feel a respect and racial pride in the undoubted achievements and growing power which Communist China has been able to attain in the face of Western opposition. This Asian identification tends to make many Japanese comparatively blind to the repulsive features of the Chinese Communist regime and to cause them to regard the American attitude toward Communist China as unduly intolerant.

While all these considerations contribute to the negative attitudes held by the Japanese toward the United States, the intensity of these attitudes varies widely. Government circles, although sometimes irked at American influence in Japanese affairs, nevertheless hold firmly to a friendly attitude toward the United States, because they realize that the basic national interests of Japan have come to coincide pretty closely with the basic national interests of the United States. Business and industrial circles, while impatient for freer trade with Communist countries, have substantially the same general attitudes as their American counterparts and generally find their close relationship mutually congenial and profitable.

Organized labor ranges from cool to hostile toward the United States, partly because a section of labor is Communist-influenced, partly because the Socialist section of labor inclines toward pacifism and neutralism in international politics, and partly because the American Occupation authorities were thought to have favored Big Business over labor in their efforts to aid Japanese eco-

conomic revival. The most critical attitude toward America is prevalent among the intellectuals and students, although it is also among intellectuals that some of the staunchest admirers of American ideals are to be found. The little man, who in the aggregate comprises the masses, has no fixed inclinations. If anything, he has an underlying bias in favor of America, for Hollywood has conditioned him to idealize America as a paradise of glamor and luxury; but he can also easily be aroused to hurt pride and resentment by inflammatory press and radio reports of supposed American slights to Japanese interests.

A Stereotype

Underlying all these attitudes is a stereotyped concept of America held by most Japanese, which seems to resemble closely the stereotyped concept of America held by most of the peoples of Europe and Asia.

All Japanese are impressed most of all by American science and technology and by the rich material aspects of American life produced by this science and technology. In the fields of pure science and theoretical medicine, however, many Japanese experts believe that their own competence has now reached the level where they could match American achievements if they had the same financial support as is available to American researchers. In the fields of applied science and engineering, the Japanese readily recognize American superiority. In any case, science and technology and their ramifications are the aspects of American life which the Japanese understand and appreciate most readily. Modern Japan reflects how avidly and successfully Western science and technology have been assimilated by the Japanese.

American economy is another aspect of American life which impresses the Japanese, for the material might of America is overwhelming. But the Japanese attribute the success of the American economy as much to the natural bountifulness of the American continent as to the genius of the American people, and wonder how applicable American experience is to the problems of a small, poor country like Japan. They feel they have

done comparatively better in proportion to their meager resources than the Americans have with their abundant resources. Although Japanese businessmen are usually eager to emulate the techniques of American business organization and administration, Japanese intellectuals suspect that many American economic ideas are valid only in the unique American environment.

Also there is the stereotypic caricature of the American capitalist which causes some Japanese to fear that Japan is being made into a satellite of Wall Street. At the same time the Japanese pray for the continuing prosperity of the American economy, for they know what havoc a depression in America would wreak on the economies of the rest of this interdependent world.

Japanese views of American political institutions are highly mixed. Disillusioned with their own political leadership which had carried them to war and disaster, the Japanese immediately after the surrender looked to America as their inspiration for a new democratic political system. Many Japanese still hold to this conception of America as a political ideal. But others have lost faith. The Occupation over-sold America and invited a let-down; the Japanese lacked adequate background to assimilate fully the political lessons proffered by the Americans; and American political characteristics are often dependent on unique American conditions that have no counterpart in Japan. While American-inspired political reforms have generally been more successfully assimilated by the Japanese than might have been expected, the American political system as a whole remains pretty much of a puzzle for most Japanese. Instead of equating America with democracy, as most Americans tend to do, the British example might be the more effective means to impart an understanding of democracy to the Japanese, for British political institutions bear a much closer relevance to the Japanese background than do their American derivatives.

American culture is the aspect of American life least understood by the Japanese. American technology and American wealth are so spectacular that the Japanese, like so many other peoples, can see little else and

think of American civilization as solely a gadget civilization dominated by materialistic values. It is something of a fad among the Japanese, especially the intellectuals, to take a supercilious, condescending attitude toward American culture. The Americans may have the machines and the money, but the Japanese have a deeper appreciation of all the finer intellectual, artistic, and spiritual aspects of life. American education is utilitarian and lacking in real intellectual content. The Americans are good-hearted, but they are simple-minded, immature, uncouth, brash, pleasure-mad, and self-centered.

These stock impressions were little changed, save for minor exceptions, by the young American G.I.'s who swarmed over Japan. Increasingly frequent visits of American symphony orchestras, scholars, men of letters, and other representatives of the less-publicized aspects of American culture are proving to be an eye-opener to the Japanese, but these visits are on too small a scale as yet to have much impact.

Of all the aspects of American culture, religion is the most puzzling to the Japanese. While retaining traditional religious forms, most Japanese in their rapid modernization have discarded their old beliefs without hav-

ing found a satisfactory modern replacement. They are therefore mostly pragmatic agnostics; only a minute fraction are Christians. Having no vital religion themselves, they are at a loss to understand the vitality of the religious dynamics of American life. They cannot imagine how a modern and scientific people like the Americans can be so superstitious as to believe in a formal religion. They wonder if American religion is not just pious hypocrisy to disguise an ugly materialistic culture, or else they give up in utter bafflement over the mysterious Americans. And, of course, without an understanding of the Judaic-Christian bases of American life, one cannot really understand the value system, the ideals, the ethics, or even the social customs of America.

With characteristic diligence many Japanese have acquired a reasonably thorough intellectual knowledge about America, but only a very few Japanese have succeeded in acquiring an intuitive feel of American life and of the American people. Japanese understanding of America is certainly no worse than the understanding of America possessed by many other peoples—and probably better than most, but it still is not one which can permit Americans much complacency.

"... In the intercourse between nations, we are apt to rely too much on the instrumental part. We lay too much weight upon the formality of treaties and compacts. We do not act much more wisely, when we trust to the interests of men as guarantees of their engagements. The interests frequently tear to pieces the engagements, and the passions trample upon both. Entirely to trust to either is to disregard our own safety, or not to know mankind. Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men without their knowledge, and sometimes against their intentions. The secret, unseen, but irrefragable bond of habitual intercourse holds them together, even when their perverse and litigious nature sets them to equivocate, scuffle, and fight about the terms of their written obligations.

"... The conformity and analogy of which I speak, incapable, like everything else, of preserving perfect trust and tranquillity among men, has a strong tendency to facilitate accommodation, and to produce a generous oblivion of the rancor of their quarrels. With this similitude, peace is more of peace, and war is less of war. . . ."

Edmund Burke, From Three Letters to a Member of Parliament on Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France, 1796-1797.

"My own experience . . . leads me to believe firmly that very few Americans know much about Africa. I have also found out that not many Americans fully appreciate the implications of United States foreign policy, or the implications of the problems and incidents in the colonial countries on the United States."

Still, notes this recent visitor, ". . . the history of the United States has identified America as the symbol of anti-colonial struggle and an inspiration to the African."

Our Revolutionary Tradition: An African View

By TOM MBOYA

General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor

IN THIS period of world power politics Africa is formulating her own attitudes, opinions, and outlook. Partitioned among different colonial powers, Africa is aware of the patterns of colonial policies of these different powers, but in all, Africans know that whatever the differences, colonialism is essentially the same. It exploits a people, it denies them their basic right to self-determination, and by a difference of degrees it subjects a people to a state of human indignity and humiliation, making them into second or third rate citizens in their own country.

Tom Mboya, who has just returned to Kenya after a speaking tour throughout the United States, was born in Kenya's White Highlands. He received his elementary and secondary education at Catholic Mission schools there. He is General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor and of his own union, the Kenya Local Government Workers' Union. He was appointed to the government sponsored Labor and Wages Advisory Boards and to the Agricultural Wages Committee. Mr. Mboya received a Workers Travel Association Scholarship for a year's course in Industrial Relations and Political Institutions at Ruskin College.

In the process of colonization many of the customs, traditions, and cultures of the colonizing powers are passed on to the colonial subjects. Thus in Africa British, French, Belgian, and Portuguese cultures, customs, and traditions will be found in the respective territories. To the educated African the language of the colonizing power becomes an indispensable tool and weapon. The educational, social, and political institutions often take on the structures of similar institutions in the metropolitan country.

Africa is thus tainted with the impact of the contact between colonial powers and its people. African opinion or attitude is therefore bound at some stage or another to reflect the influence and direction of this impact. Having been educated in French or British educational institutions, for instance, an African is bound to reflect in his viewpoint an element of French or British background or approach.

These introductory remarks are made to help show how the African's attitude to America can be founded or affected and influenced by factors of colonialism. Firstly, the fact that the United States is not a colonial power in the strict sense of the word puts her immediately in a special position. Secondly, the relations between the colonial powers and the United States become a factor in the formulation of the African's attitude to America; and thirdly, the African approach may in some cases be

similar to the approach of the colonial power, depending on how widespread the influence of the metropolitan country is in the particular part of Africa.

What do Africans think of the United States? This is a question which I have been asked time and time again during my two months' visit to the States. In the answer to this question naturally more attention was paid to the African attitude to United States foreign policy and to America's stand on colonialism. Today everywhere in Africa there is a growing restlessness against colonialism. The degree of course differs but the feeling is widespread. There is a growing nationalism and an increasing awareness of international relations.

The Africans hear more and more of the United Nations and its activities. They hear of the stand taken by various nations on matters relating to colonialism, South African apartheid policies, problems of the underdeveloped countries and so forth. In other words, they keenly follow what is going on in those places and organizations where decisions are made that might in one way or another affect their interests. Their attitude to the various nations is therefore influenced by the record of the position taken by these nations on the relevant questions brought up in the United Nations and its agencies. The United States as much as other nations is subject to this scrutiny.

The foregoing is a preamble to enable you to follow the line of arguments and points raised in this article. In analyzing the United States as it looks in the eyes of Africans we shall try to deal with various points and factors separately. A start would be made by reference to American history.

American History

The American War of Independence and the events before, during and after the war put her in a position where she symbolizes the struggle and success of a people to free themselves from the yoke of colonialism. This history with its many spectacular incidents is held as an example of how far a people must be prepared to sacrifice their own personal comfort in order to free themselves of colonialism. It is also looked upon

as the very basis on which colonialism must be condemned in Africa. The Boston Tea Party, the Stamp Acts, and the "No taxation without representation" slogan, to quote only a few aspects of this history, are common knowledge among Africans. In many African public meetings and other discussions on colonialism this history is constantly referred to and the various aspects and incidents are used to clarify or justify arguments. Quotations are taken from prominent Americans of the past. Abraham Lincoln's philosophy of democracy—"A Government of the People, by the People, for the People"—is a common slogan and part of the philosophy of many African political parties and leaders.

Through her history the United States is an inspiration to the African people in their struggle against colonialism. By virtue of this history and what it symbolizes, there is a sense of remote likeness, sometimes even of belonging, and an unspoken acceptance of America as the symbol of heroic victory over colonialism. Some sentimentalism exists among Africans who believe that because of her history the United States is an automatic and ready ally against colonialism.

Another factor related to this sentimentalism and remote sense of belonging is the presence of the Negro people in the United States. Here the feeling in Africa may differ according to whether a particular region has a European settler community or not. Where no race problems take prominence in the struggle against colonialism, the Negro is looked upon as a betrayal by the American people of the principles for which they fought and claim to stand, and sentimentalism is very much less.

On the other hand, in those areas where color bar and race discrimination are rigidly applied, the Negro's achievements in America play some part in furthering the feeling of sentimentalism and identifying America as an anti-colonial power. Naturally segregation and the treatment of the Negro in the South is condemned, but the Negro achievements are looked upon with admiration and a sense of pride since in these the colored people's potential is manifest, given similar or equal opportunities. Thus in these multi-racial areas of Africa there is a ready identification with and acceptance of the Negro.

In West Africa, on the other hand, there is yet another possible factor. There are a good number of West Africans educated in American universities. This extends back as early as the days of Dr. Aggrey—popularly known as Aggrey of Achimota. Two of the most dynamic and prominent leaders of West Africa today are American-educated: Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Premier of the Gold Coast, and Dr. Azikiwe ("Zik" to his people), Premier of the Eastern Region of Nigeria.

It will therefore be seen that the history of the United States has identified America as the symbol of anti-colonial struggle and an inspiration to the African. In this particular America is regarded with admiration, respect and expectancy. The sense of expectancy is based on the feeling that she is in a better position to understand problems of colonialism, having gone through the mill, so to speak. This feeling is today manifest in the relations between India and many parts of Africa.

In so far as America is concerned, however, this feeling is gradually changing to one of puzzled disappointment. In the post-war years, and particularly in the last four or five years, the alliance between the United States, Britain and France has been regarded in African circles with concern, since in some cases this alliance has included support for or sympathy with Britain or France in matters relating to their colonial territories. In some cases where the United States government has decided to remain neutral, Africans have felt this has been done to retain the friendship of the British and French allies. This sacrifice of principles for the sake of expediency has been regarded with concern throughout Africa. Two recent cases in point are the American position over Cyprus and Algeria.

America's position regarding the South African situation has on the other hand been hailed, but the inconsistency of policy at the United Nations has been regarded with a great deal of concern and disappointment, because Africans have expected and still expect a lot from the United States government. Those Africans who have visited the United States are, however, immediately struck by the response they get from the

American public and the readiness of the American people to help in projects aimed at improving African conditions. The problem, however, is that too few Americans actually ever get a chance to establish this personal contact.

The United States Point IV plan is heard of but is not seen or felt in any tangible form, since it is administered through the colonial powers. Sometimes this aid has been looked upon or interpreted as aid to colonial powers to ensure their continued ability to run the colonies, thus appearing to be a form of subsidy for what the colonial power should contribute on its own. Contrast this with the Indian government's policy of granting cultural scholarships to African students to study at Indian universities. The Indian offer is more tangible and is looked upon with a greater degree of appreciation. This is, however, the position in the non-self-governing territories and may not be true of the self-governing African States.

The self-governing states differ according to whether they are members of the British Commonwealth or stand completely alone. But generally speaking, most self-governing states welcome and encourage contact with the United States. In this respect there is just some reservation developing among these states for fear of unnecessary or undesirable political implications. There is a growing fear that the United States may, as a result of the current power politics, seek to attach too many political strings to her relations or aid to self-governing African states. As a result of this caution is often advocated, and a neutralist approach or policy gradually adopted.

The self-governing states in Africa realize the futility of accepting any position which might lead to economic domination, thus putting themselves once more under a foreign power. Also, because of the numerous economic and social problems that must be faced by these new and young states, most Africans believe it is to the best interests of their people to refrain from being deeply involved in power politics.

Most Africans recognize the threat of communism but argue that the menace cannot be met by political bickering but by positive plans of social and economic advancement of

the underdeveloped countries. They see on the other hand too much emphasis being placed on political slogans and negative anti-communism. They feel that the best way to counter the threat of communism is to give people an alternative that is more attractive than communism, and to live and practice democracy. It is not enough to preach democracy or Christianity unless it is lived.

They look at the continued colonialism of Britain, France and Belgium as hypocritical in the light of their signatures to the United Nations Charter and the Human Rights Declaration, and regard the lack of a definite and positive stand by the United States government against continued colonialism as a betrayal of her stand on the right to self-determination. It is believed generally that a strong stand by the United States government can be a decisive factor in the African struggle for self-determination.

Coupled with this relative lack of adherence to the United Nations Charter and respect for Human Rights, domestic politics in the United States have not been very reassuring. The segregation of Negroes in schools in the South and particularly the recent developments harmed American prestige. As the upholder of democracy the United States is expected to be blameless within her own boundaries. On the other hand, the Supreme Court decision of 1954 is hailed by many Africans, particularly in British East and Central Africa and in South Africa, where Africans do not have the right to bring discriminatory practices before courts.

A word about the labor movement. There is a growing solidarity and understanding between the American labor movement and the African trade union movement. This has been made possible by affiliation of both movements with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the International Trade Secretariats, and through some of the exchange programs. Already some unions in America have extended material help to African unions apart from the over-all contributions they make through the I.C.F.T.U.

In the field of foreign policy it will be seen, therefore, that America's position in the eyes of Africans is rather disappointingly hazy. She has not lived up to their expecta-

tions and internally the segregation problems have affected American prestige and moral standing. Her people are however still regarded with friendship and expectancy, although it has become generally recognized that there exists a great deficiency of informed opinion on Africa.

Culturally and socially, African knowledge is limited to the publicity of America's material well-being and the provision of a high standard of living for her people. The African reads of the fabulous riches of America and the wealth of its people. He sees the movies portraying the extent of these riches, and others showing the Wild West, cowboy, gun-slinging life. American cars imported into certain parts of Africa are held as manifestations of the extent of American wealth.

Very little is known of the culture and the real social life of the American people. Where as in certain areas, e.g. the copper belt of the Rhodesias, American capital has been regarded with appreciation for its relative readiness to recognize workers' interests, in other areas American capital has sown the seeds of suspicion, e.g., in Liberia, as to what might happen if this capital becomes too powerful and politically entrenched. American education is sought for, not because very much is known of the American educational system or structure but because of the recognition of the high degree of American technological achievement.

In this article I have tried to interpret the current African opinions in relation particularly to American foreign policy. My own experience after a short but extensive visit leads me to believe firmly that very few Americans know much about Africa. I have also found out that not many Americans fully appreciate the implications of United States foreign policy, or the implications of the problems and incidents in the colonial countries on the United States. Thus I feel convinced that much is needed in the way of creating a more enlightened public opinion.

The impact of some films that have been made in Africa is sometimes to be detected among American audiences by the presence of Americans who have been led to believe that these films actually portray current life in Africa. An attack on this lack of knowl-

edge could be made through the film world by making films of modern Africa, its towns and cities, its educated and working or wage-earning populations, and its African political advancement and leadership.

I believe that African confidence in America can be restored if the United States government will play the role which Africans expect of her, and if there is general recognition of growing nationalism in Africa and the need to relate policy to the circumstances

of today's changing Africa. Above all, the United States is looked on as the champion of the United Nations Charter and the Human Rights Declaration, and is therefore expected to respect and live by this Charter and Declaration both within her own territorial boundaries and on the international level. She is expected to recognize the right of people to self-determination, and not to be neutral or uncommitted where this right is threatened or denied.

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"... In many of the values and in many of the methods that have evolved in America there are elements that could be adapted to a different set of cultural circumstances." This author points out that "Perhaps what is described as the 'Americanization' of the world is merely a process of 'modernization' which occurs independently from overt American influences."

Our New Social Democracy: A European View

BY GUY S. MÉTRAUX

Author of *Exchange of Persons: The Evolution of Cross Cultural Education*

THE EUROPEAN who has been fortunate enough to know the United States at first hand for a relatively long time is, on his return to Europe, faced with a desire to integrate his American experience into the fabric of his life and reconcile it with his immediate environment. American culture possesses a dynamism and power of attraction difficult to resist, but since it is a culture so different from that of Europe, such a process of integration is very difficult. In this paper, I should like to review briefly the attitude of the European to American history and through this the resultant American society and to point out certain political, social and cultural features which in the mind of a sympathetic observer constitute the dynamism and distinguish it.

American history is, to most Europeans, frankly a *terra incognita* which is brushed aside almost with contempt. For some it lacks glamour and drama; for others it lacks

great historical figures around which the spirit of an era coalesces; for still others it is merely a series of footnotes to the major themes of European history: the Wars of Religion, the upheaval of the French Revolution, the Wars of Napoleon, and so forth.

The principal events of American history—the struggle for Independence, the Westward Movement, the Civil War—seem remote and isolated to an European mind trained to see history on a large scale of conflicting nations or in reference to great personalities. Furthermore, the absence of age-old historical landmarks of the type common in Europe creates the impression that the United States is strangely lacking in history. The few events in American history that are known—in continental Europe at least—appear singly rather than as part of the development of a nation.

Yet for the person who has lived in the United States, history is very much there, for the traditions of a nation that originated with thirteen struggling colonies in a new world and developed into a great power manifest themselves in the American's attitude toward state and society. It is in the study of these attitudes that the European finds the "new" evolution of the American society and through this begins to understand that society and to judge it by a scale of values different from customary European values. While American history shows the continuous evolution and enrichment of political democracy, an experience in American living can develop an awareness of a

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new social democracy in which mobility and opportunity are perhaps more significant than equality as social dynamics. This experience also makes one aware of cultural democracy with its own specific modes of expression within patterns that are traditional to Western civilization as a whole.

Taking into account the divergent nationalities that comprise the American people, the European living in the United States is struck by their homogeneity. The young nation that emerged from the War of Independence developed such a firm base for a unique American way of living that the many national groups contributing to the common stock of the American people have, comparatively, contributed very little to American culture. The immigrants who established themselves on American soil gradually gave up their national and cultural identity to adopt a new way of life which, in a very small measure, allowed the survival of minor customs.

Culturally, the significant fact is not the survival but the abandonment of customs and traditions that in Europe have resisted centuries of contact. Individual achievements of "foreigners" or "aliens," whether first or second generation, were made in terms of American culture and in almost complete identification with the American way of life, rather than in terms of national origins.

It would be difficult to single out those elements in American culture that make up this force of attraction and that have prevented the formation of an aggregate of many cultures acting contrapuntally. It is possible that this force resides in the many opportunities for participation which American culture affords to anyone living there: that is, participation in economic and political life, in social and artistic life, whether nationally or locally. I would go so far as to say that active and overt participation in the life of the group is a primary feature of American living and that it is one of the conditions of reward. Strong economic and social sanctions exist, and participation is also imposed on the group through social pressure (so decried in some of its forms by sociologists) and probably through publicity and propaganda. It is perhaps con-

ducive to a certain conformism; but it is probably essential to maintain a certain homogeneity in a society that has been opened to all individuals.

Man and the Law

I was always very much struck by the relationship of the individual in the United States to law and authority which, to my mind, illustrates the self-reliant individualism of the Americans. It is particularly notable in the constant and general use by the Americans of the courts to emphasize personal rights against real or imaginary encroachments of local administration or even federal power. "J. Citizen vs. the United States . . .," a formula often appearing in American textbooks, is perhaps one of the most genuine expressions of the confidence of the Americans in their system and of their rights as individuals. The place of the judiciary in American history (an aspect very little known in Europe except to specialists) is enviable. The history of the Constitution is also a fascinating record of an institution which, through judicial decisions, has been adapted to changing social and economic circumstances.

Progress through change and mobility which, together with self-reliant individualism, was placed very high in the scale of values of the American people, has given to historical evolution in the United States a very peaceful character because evolution was achieved through gradual adjustments in constitutional law, in economic organization, in administrative procedures, even in social values. This does not mean that I believe for one instant that America has solved all its social and economic problems and that American history has been exempt from violence. However, I would stress that the solution given to economic and social problems resulted in definite progress, in social gains for the society as a whole without disrupting its fundamental structure or weakening its basic values. Moreover, change was made within the evolving climate of opinion; it was not imposed from above. This is in contrast with most of European history in which more often than not significant social and economic change

—even when it was for the best—was the consequence of revolution or of an “enlightened” autocracy.

It has been argued that in many areas of human activity American achievements were much less important than European. The charge of “materialism” has been often aimed at the United States, a charge that carried with it the idea of a lack of “spiritual values” which, in Western society, are equated with civilization. There is a certain amount of truth in this statement. In a society with its opportunity for advancement open to all individuals the industrial revolution took root and expanded to the point where the whole economy of the United States was based on mass production and big business, an economy that pervades the outlook and attitudes of the American. But it is in this same society with its mobility, without traditionalism to hamper its progress, that the material existence of each member reached a height of comfort unknown in European countries. Lack of prejudice in regard to certain occupations, success rather than the type of work being the standard of value, gave the American a much wider choice for “making a living” than was traditional in Western society. However, success, based on the accumulation of capital or income, a wholly materialistic standard, took to a large extent the place of the standards of achievement of which European nations have so long been proud.

Yet wealth creates leisure, and in the United States one becomes aware of the efforts made by the American people as a whole to rise above their materialistic existence and seek outlets in creative activities. Starting with perhaps the less personally creative work, one finds the “Do-It-Yourself” technique, so often the butt of jokes, by which Americans seek to employ their leisure time in useful pursuits. Setting aside the actual contributions of American artists, I would like to stress that the American attitude of sharing in the benefits of his society is also seen in the higher arts. For example, American theatre has been criticized as being too highly concentrated in one or two centers, yet one must take into account the multitude of “summer” and community theatres scattered throughout the United States.

Here future professionals make a modest start, here also people for whom the stage is a hobby find an opportunity to participate actively in dramatic expression. Likewise, throughout the country, one finds well-equipped art centers where people paint, model or sculpt in wood or stone.

Bringing the opportunity for cultural advancement within the reach of all are low-priced phonograph records, which in Europe are sold as luxury items, and paper-bound books at low prices, sold by the hundreds of thousands. One should also mention television, which for all its blatant publicity, has widened the interests of the people and strengthened the feeling of participation in the life and activities of the nation. It must be said, however, in all fairness, that the commercial need to reach the mass results in the low artistic level of some productions, although claims are made for their “entertainment” value.

With this wealth goes the desire to travel, as the mass migration to Europe every summer testifies. Along with the minority that travels to Europe because it enhances their social position at home, one finds that the majority earnestly seeks the values of European culture. At the same time Americans match their own attitudes and ideas against those of Europeans. Crushed and haunted by two world wars, the European understandably resents the material well-being of the American and his proselytizing attitudes. Yet living in America for any length of time, he is caught up in that material comfort and the “newness” of the life.

Achievements in Education

The participation in the life of the group which was stressed above is also reflected in the place given to instruction in American culture. Education in the United States is not a pursuit *per se* or a tool for the acquisition of social status (although it is useful in acquiring economic status), but rather a means for making further and greater opportunities available to the young citizen, the type of opportunity occupying perhaps a secondary place. In other words, no differential value is given to any one type of achievement provided that a certain visible success is ultimately reached.

This system, which has been very much criticized by European educators, has nonetheless made possible the development of a complex network of institutions of learning that no other country has so far been able to create. It has allowed experimentation and the refinement of certain fields of knowledge that have put the United States in the forefront of modern science. It is significant that a recent sociological study of Nobel Prize winners in the sciences indicated that in the last twenty years the majority of recipients were not only Americans but *American trained*.

In the above survey, which had to be somewhat superficial because of the limitation set on the length of this paper, I have tried to outline certain of the features of American culture which seem to me important. While many of these aspects could be argued for and against at great length, it is more difficult to determine to what extent some of them can serve as models for European society in a period of change. The circumstances of American history cannot be reproduced; the attitudes of the American people cannot be readily transferred to peoples that have lived through other historical traditions. Yet in many of the values and in many of the methods that have evolved in America there are elements that could be adapted to a different set of cultural circumstances.

Modern living as a by-product of the Industrial Revolution and of the greater inter-

dependence of the peoples of the world makes certain demands on human society that are not primarily dependent on national cultural traditions. The great strength of American society was its ability to adapt itself more quickly and readily to those demands. Perhaps what is described as the "Americanization" of the world is merely a process of "modernization" which occurs independently from overt American influences.

Increasingly the products of American material culture are becoming the symbols of modern living. Unfortunately the complex system of values which has made possible these material achievements is more often than not either misunderstood or ignored. Yet there is a close relationship between spiritual values and material products. As the world becomes more industrialized, as middle classes and individuals become more articulate in expressing their aspirations, as the products of modern industry and science become more readily available, it is possible that many nations will make their own some of the principal features of the American way of life which developed in a climate of change and progress.

In this sense, the unity of mankind will become closer to reality as material conditions improve for all, and self-reliance is acquired by all. American history has shown one of the ways to navigate the course of history, keeping in close contact with reality yet moving confidently forward through the unknown shoals of the future.



"We are the mediating Nation of the world. I do not mean that we undertake not to mind our own business and to mediate where other people are quarreling. I mean the word in a broader sense. We are compounded of the nations of the world; we mediate their blood, we mediate their traditions, we mediate their sentiments, their tastes, their passions; we are ourselves compounded of those things. We are therefore, able to understand all nations; we are able to understand them in the compound, not separately, as partisans, but unitedly as knowing and comprehending and embodying them all. It is in that sense that I mean that America is a mediating Nation. The opinion of America, the action of America, is ready to turn, and free to turn, in any direction. . . . The United States has no racial momentum. It has no history back of it which makes it run all its energies and all its ambitions in one particular direction."

—Woodrow Wilson, 1915.

Noting that "... the forces bent on destroying democratic order and civilian rule in the South look to the United States to obtain arms," this well-known author writes that "there are two great institutions in the United States in which Latin America puts its highest hopes. One is the press . . . another less conspicuous but equally effective institution is the university."

One America Looks at the Other

BY GERMAN ARCINIEGAS

Professor of Spanish, Columbia University

LOOKING AT the United States from a distance, as from Russia, Egypt, India, South Africa or Japan, or even from Italy or France, one has the advantage of perspective, which should enable one to get a good over-all picture. Not so the next-door neighbor. From his window he is constantly seeing the small, intimate details that sometimes stand in the way of his forming a true evaluation of the whole. For a Mexican, as in a greater or lesser degree for a Colombian, a Chilean or an Argentine, the United States is a fellow-owner of a common property. Its inhabitants are people with whom he has daily dealings, with whom he converses regularly on topics of mutual concern such as business, politics and education.

This sense of being neighbors was accentuated by the First World War. Until then, despite geography, Latin Americans felt closer to Paris than to New York. In their universities they studied French texts, while their poets and politicians alike sought inspiration in Montmartre or the Sorbonne. The great literary movement known as

"modernism" which transformed the poetry of Latin America and Spain was the work of poets who took their lead from a Central American known as an habitué of the cafés of Paul Verlaine. The political changes which gave Latin America a liberal orientation during the years from 1910 to 1930 were wrought by young politicians who had spent their student days in Paris absorbing the new concept of political science. It is not amiss to note here, too, that the ladies of Buenos Aires or Lima society crossed the seas to acquire their wardrobes from the house of Paquin.

Then came the World Wars. The First; the Second. The Atlantic became an impassable sea. No longer were French scientific journals received by the libraries of schools of engineering and medicine. People began reading English. Slowly the new language penetrated an area that until then had been regarded as exclusively Latin. Graduate medical students began coming—and still come—to the hospitals of New York, Philadelphia and Rochester to serve their internships. Many a Latin American engineer studied for his degree at M.I.T. Newspapers which once depended entirely upon the services of Havas and Reuters now subscribe to the U.P. and A.P. Every important novel by a United States writer is translated into Spanish and published in Buenos Aires. Books such as these fill the windows of shops all over Spanish-speaking America. School girls looking for sportswear, brides planning their trousseaus, matrons replenishing their supply of lingerie, hats and shoes, fly to Miami or New York to do their shopping.

Until the First World War the Latin

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Americans who traveled to Europe were likely to be members of the 40 families of the old oligarchy which carried on in each capital the privileges of the former Spanish empire. Today easy travel facilities and the relatively low cost of air passage have brought thousands of middle-class people from the south into the cities of the United States, to say nothing of workers and peasants, who now constitute huge colonies here. Mexican laborers slip illegally over the border into Texas and California.

It is no longer a novelty to hear Latin American accents in the streets, the shops, the factories and even the fields anywhere in the 48 states. With a little effort, any typist working in an office in Bogota, Caracas or Habana can send her son to finish his studies in Berkeley, Miami or Chicago. The second language in the great cities of the United States today is Spanish. In New York, the area where theaters advertise Mexican or Argentine films for an ever-growing Spanish-speaking audience is spreading by the day. Along certain streets, such as the uptown stretches of Broadway, Madison and Fifth Avenues, more and more stores put up signs saying "granero" or "bodega" instead of "groceries."

At bottom, these facts constitute a geographical revolution as profound as that which has made events in Asia a major concern of western politics, or that which has confronted us with the startling spectacle of an Africa forging its independence. But here the sudden drawing together of the two poles of the Western Hemisphere, constituting as it were the emergence of a new continent where formerly there were only isolated nations each going its own way, must produce and is already producing far-reaching changes in the evolution of democracy in our time. Have we yet realized the full implications of this new situation? Have we alerted ourselves to be ready for the changes which the immediate future will bring? Surely these are questions that deserve to be pondered.

We are experiencing an unforeseen development that has changed not only the life of the republics south of the Rio Grande, but of the United States itself. And as usually happens in such cases, the speed with which

this has occurred has outstripped the capacity of the political mind to comprehend it. With the highest birthrate in the world, Latin America has a population that threatens to equal the Soviet Union's, and is rapidly becoming industrialized. The general public in the United States does not realize that Latin America has suffered a series of damaging blows to its democratic structure, a fact which does not seem to have aroused any serious concern in United States political circles.

It is true that the quantity of news about "Latin America" published today by a paper such as *The New York Times* is vastly greater than was customary 15 years ago. Every week editorials comment, sometimes with extraordinary insight, on the latest incident in Argentine politics, a change that has taken place in Brazil, and even details of elections in Honduras, Ecuador or Peru. Weekly magazines have sections devoted to "The Hemisphere," and that hemisphere is usually understood to mean only the republics to the south—rarely is there mention of Canada.

It is also true that these 20 republics today have a population larger than that of the United States; that they offer the United States its best export market; that the largest investments of United States capital are now being made in these countries; that no other countries have such large colonies in the United States, interested in what the newspapers and magazines here have to say about their respective motherlands; and that the 20 votes of these republics in the United Nations could theoretically contribute more than any other combination to the advancement of the cause of democracy in the deliberations of the General Assembly.

At the same time it must be admitted that occasionally Washington is guilty of mental lapses in which Latin America appears to be forgotten altogether. Such is the inconsistency of the State Department's policy—under whatever administration—that it swings from openly opposing a dictatorship to supporting it with words or actions. The change in the attitude toward Peron showed at the very least a woeful lack of good information and political vision. When such mistakes are made, they leave an after-

taste of resentment which is not easily overcome by efforts, usually belated, to make amends.

Everyone knows that closeness, whether in private life or international affairs, creates difficult situations. It is not easy to be a good neighbor, and when Roosevelt made this ideal the cornerstone of hemisphere relations, he not only formulated a policy but initiated a new way of thinking, a whole new outlook on inter-American affairs. If our closeness did not provoke heated reactions and a distorted sense of proportion, small incidents which tend to be dramatized by the suspicious mind of the south would go unnoticed.

Sometimes a single gesture can change a whole psychological state. Just as Theodore Roosevelt's phrase, "I took Panama," gave the green light through the 20 republics to a flood of literature condemning Yankee imperialism, so Woodrow Wilson's phrase offering Colombia "sincere regret" made it possible to bridge the abyss which has opened up, and the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt ushered in an era of cordial relations without precedent in the experience of this century.

The era of armed intervention by the United States in the Caribbean region, which created so much bitterness, is long past. Nevertheless, the Latin American sees military or financial aid to a dictator as an equally effective though indirect form of intervention. It is each country's own sin when it lets a *caudillo* seize power and stifle its organs of public opinion, and in such cases no small responsibility rests with the political parties which proved incapable of handling the internal situation. Yet it should not be forgotten that some of the worst dictatorships in Latin America today, such as those in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, are the long-range consequences of intervention by the American Marines. Nor can a Latin American fail to see in the imposition of the Castillo Armas dictatorship in Guatemala the most blatant kind of intervention by the United States for the purpose of eliminating a regime which it was up to the people of Guatemala to throw off.

The most serious problem that confronts

the Hemisphere today, and that will affect world politics in the future, is the systematic destruction of democratic processes in Latin America. This destruction is being brought about by military dictatorships, which in many countries have wiped out the last vestiges of civilian organization and representative government, subjugating congresses, newspapers, universities, industries, juridical organs, political parties, and suppressing even religious freedoms and the rights set forth in the universal Charter of the United Nations.

Not only have the military powers which thus seek to thwart the very destiny of the continent not met with the disfavor of the United States, but they have actually been armed by Washington far beyond the needs of each country. The ex-President of Colombia, Dr. Eduardo Santos, speaking during the Columbia University centennial celebration, said that what we were witnessing in the republics to the south was the occupation of countries by their own armies. To us it is incomprehensible that this process should have met with indifference and in some cases even been encouraged. If the foundations of democracy are to be destroyed in this fashion, if these peoples are to be offered nothing but a choice between neo-Nazism and pro-Communism, then the one hundred and seventy million inhabitants of Latin America cannot be a force for good in the Hemisphere.

But the picture is not all as discouraging as this. The peoples to the south have a profound feeling for democracy, and even in the face of the greatest adversity they fight to regain it, sometimes with success. Argentina found in the younger Army officers themselves, in the students and in the people, once they were freed from Peronist pressure, the strength to root out one of the totalitarian regimes which had seemed to be most firmly established. In Peru, a purely civilian movement liquidated another military dictatorship. In Nicaragua a desperate and heroic youth resorted to personal attack to put an end to the life of dictator Somoza, offering up his own life in the act. Sometimes the United States fails to realize how public opinion in Latin America reacts to events such as this. It is significant that while the

assassination of Somoza was described here as a "cowardly attack," the Uruguayan Parliament devoted a session to honoring the memory of the boy who had carried it out.

The peoples of Latin America know that the United States has created powerful bulwarks for its own internal freedoms; they know that it is making heroic efforts to overcome the racial prejudices of certain old-established groups which have failed to keep pace with the growing spirit of equality of the nation as a whole; they know that its intervention in the two World Wars was motivated by its devotion to the defense of democracy and freedom; and it disconcerts them when they see that in such a country official circles frequently fail to appreciate the significance of the civilian effort to preserve freedom in Latin America. Or to put it the other way around, and more accurately: that the forces bent on destroying democratic order and civilian rule in the south look to the United States to obtain arms.

Latin Americans believe that Washington's mistakes are simply the result of misinformation. They are convinced that once public opinion in this country knows the facts of a situation, it will support democratic ideas and censure dictatorial regimes. No one doubts that if the State Department had a better understanding of the deepest currents of Latin American thought and feeling, it would make every effort to help the republics to the south reestablish free and representative forms of government. For this very reason Latin Americans are the more disconcerted and dismayed when such support is not forthcoming.

A few weeks ago the Congress for Cultural Freedom held a conference in Mexico City. Some of the United States delegates were noticeably shocked to hear fiery speeches that seemed to blame their country for all of Latin America's ills. These outbursts were of course exaggerated. But they revealed a deep feeling which it would be well for the United States to recognize. For basically they dramatized something which is a legitimate cause of concern to the Latin American peoples: the future of democracy in this Hemisphere. As far as each individual republic is concerned, its government is its own business, and no one can say that the Latin

American peoples have not been struggling valiantly for their salvation. But the fate of the whole Hemisphere is involved. The preservation or destruction of democracy in South Africa or the Near or Far East is of grave concern to the United States within its orbit of global influence. But surely the destruction of democracy on its own doorstep should be even graver. The prospect that the Hemisphere in which we live may become the scene of a new totalitarian experiment cannot but alarm the peoples of Latin America.

There are two great institutions in the United States in which Latin America puts its highest hopes. One is the press. The Inter-American Press Association has been playing an important role in the defense of freedom of the press in the countries to the south. For the first time, all the great newspapers of the Hemisphere have succeeded in joining in an endeavor to maintain a bill of rights for journalism, the first step in guaranteeing the free flow of information and free discussion of the topics of daily life. With a combined circulation of many millions, the newspapers affiliated with the I.A.P.A. constitute internationally a formidable daily champion of the public's right to be informed. The case of *La Prensa* of Buenos Aires is a striking example, for it epitomized everything that is abhorrent in a totalitarian regime, and this example, pointed out to the world day after day, eventually rallied public opinion, which unanimously rejoiced at the overthrow of the dictatorship.

Another less conspicuous but equally effective institution is the university. Today the colleges and universities of this country are attended by thousands of Latin American students, who will take back to their countries civic attitudes and habits of freedom and responsibility which they will not easily forget. There is need for an organization which would give these thousands of students a heightened consciousness of their political function, in the best meaning of the term: a fraternity of Latin American students with chapters in all universities, which would foster a sense of solidarity among them. In professional life, as doctors, architects, chemists, engineers, agronomists,

and so forth, the former students of United States universities will find themselves in positions of leadership where their native heritage, their profoundly and irrevocably Latin American spirit, will combine with the best that this country has to offer.

In a book of mine which I called "The State of Latin America," I tried to stress the fact that there are two Americas in the republics to the south. One is the visible, official Latin America which too frequently represents only the small nucleus that has seized power by force in a given country. This aspect of America has no more importance than that which it derives from the momentary exercise of power, the accidental circumstance of the fleeting present. Its place in history will be no more than this,

and will probably not be an enviable place. But there is still the invisible America, the America of the vast multitudes who cannot always express themselves but who will sooner or later be the masters of their fate, and who basically constitute all that matters in the way of public opinion, however muffled its voice may be for the present. In the consciousness of the common man in the republics to the south there is a deep desire to achieve a Pan American Union of Public Opinion, an organization of American peoples which we are confident would receive the support of the people of the United States and of public opinion in this country. We believe that we may legitimately fasten our hopes on that ideal.

"Then let us think about those countries which are not allies of ours but are not satellites of the Soviet Union either. They cover at least half of the human race. In spite of promising prospects for the future, they are, for the most part, poor today and under the constant menace of famine and disease. They must be helped to the point where they are able and eager to stand on their own feet. Not only does common humanity urge us to extend such help; it also has the practical advantage of meaning that in case of emergency they will thus be able to fight for themselves. We must not view these countries with petulance or impatience; the so-called neutral who irritates you occasionally is certainly preferable to the enemy who aims to overcome you.

"Let us try to see what people in these countries think about us.

"When, for example, they think of the war of the American Revolution, they are not interested in the caliber of the muskets which were used, or of George Washington's generalship at Valley Forge, but in the ideals of the Declaration of Independence which made the bearers of these muskets lay down their lives.

"When people in those underdeveloped countries think of our Civil War, they do not think of the mechanisms of the various pieces of artillery on each side of the line at Gettysburg but of the abolition of slavery and the ideals which prompted the self-sacrifice of the men who fell there. They think of Abraham Lincoln and the reverence he felt for the Declaration of Independence—which once led him to remark here in Philadelphia that there was something in that declaration 'which gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time.'

"World War II does not stand in their minds because of the equipment and the money which were poured into it but because, by dint of great sacrifice, it successfully repelled brutal aggression and established the pattern for the world in which we now live.

"... A heartfelt display of friendliness and brotherhood, a sincere appeal to the feeling in every human breast that there is an element of glory for every man in this world—these intangibles can do everything in situations where bombers or dollars can do nothing."

—Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 200th Commencement Address at the University of Pennsylvania, June 13, 1956.

"Generally speaking," says this author, "all Egyptians agree on one point concerning America and the Americans: they are sorry that the creation of Israel has disturbed the waters between Egypt and a country worthy of love and respect."

Our Foreign Policy: An Egyptian View

BY HUSSEIN MONES

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IT is quite obvious that the Egyptian's conception of America should be different from the English or French or even Chinese conception. An Englishman knows that his ancestors made America. The Americans of today are—one way or another—his cousins. He may disapprove of many things taking place over there. He may even be angry, or disappointed. But all the same, he has a certain measure of affinity towards those far-off cousins.

The Frenchman has generally nothing in common with the American. But none the less, America for him is a resort, a support and a hope. He may be angry now with the attitude America is taking towards his own country and its interests. But this anger will never make him stop feeling certain affinities with the Americans.

The Chinese has many grievances toward the Americans. But it is quite different with the Egyptian. He has neither affinity nor grievance. His feeling toward America is very difficult to define, because the existence of Israel and the problems it created for all Arabs are, and will be always, a high wall that stops him from looking to America in the way he did before, let us say, 1948.

Up to 1948 America had, in the eyes of Egyptians, a very different appearance. That does not mean that this event turned the hearts of Egyptians completely, but it means that it marked a violent and even sudden change of attitudes and feelings.

I am recollecting now the picture of America in our hearts and eyes between 1918 and 1942. In 1918, for instance, America was the symbol of hope. I remember the sentimentality with which Egyptian politi-

cians of 1918 alluded to America. Those were the unforgettable days of President Wilson and his famous conditions for peace. In every note or memorandum Egyptian leaders wrote they dedicated a paragraph or more to the noble Mr. Wilson and his doctrines. They even established an agency in New York to make the Egyptian cause better known to the American public opinion. Egyptian papers in those days were enthusiastic to everything American. I remember a good number of articles describing the prosperity of the land, the felicity of the people "which is based on their wisdom, their noble hearts and amazing intelligence," to quote the very words of one of the eminent writers of the day. I'll relate a small anecdote which illustrates perfectly this conception of America.

We were living in the City of Benha, near Cairo. All of a sudden the city was invaded by a well-planned propaganda campaign for health pills of a certain Doctor Ross and a tonic called Vigoran. No sooner did the people find out that both were American than they rushed to pharmacies, getting all they could afford of both preparations.

A certain neighbor of ours, Cheikh Ayanb by name, had diligently employed them, for he was in need of good effective tonics. Three months passed by without any noticeable improvement in his failing health. He went to the drugstore to discuss the problem. The chemist said: "You should wait some more months to have a noticeable result." "They say on their announcement," retorted the angry man, "that you will have a result within less than three months." The chemist said, "This is propaganda, you

know. They write this to make you buy, but sure you will have a result, go on with those pills." The man was angry and said, "Not those people. I know them, if they say three months, that means three months. If there is anything wrong, it should be your fault. You have given me something else!" This anecdote illustrates the confidence our people had in the 1920's in everything that came from America.

In fact, there had been a deep-rooted confidence in America since the second half of the nineteenth century. As a result of a long series of deceptions by European specialists employed by the Egyptian government between 1800 and 1860 (the most significant was the case of the Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps) the Egyptian government turned back to Americans. Around 1860, the formation of a new Egyptian army was given to an American officer, General Stone. A couple of years later an American, Major Chaillé-Long, became chief of army staff. The whole policy was thwarted by Anglo-French maneuvers. They succeeded from 1826 onwards in controlling the whole administration and excluded from the administration all Americans, Swiss and the like, and paved the way for complete occupation by the British in September, 1882.

Fortunately for the rest of the Middle East, this did not occur in Lebanon, where American technical aid, in education and otherwise, continued untroubled after 1861. The American College, which became afterwards the American University of Beirut, succeeded in establishing a tradition beneficial to the whole Arab world. No student of Arabic modern cultural renaissance can forget members like Cornelius Van Dyke or John Wortbat who represented the humanitarian spirit of the American serving abroad. They lived with their students, talked Arabic (Van Dyke wrote Arabic verse!); other disciples served in the whole Arab world, and especially Egypt.

In Egypt, they gave a momentous push to journalism. Thanks to the papers and the magazines they established and attention they paid to everything that came from America, they developed a real interest in American things in their readers, and at least one big Egyptian writer devoted his

energies for long years to preaching the American spirit and way of life. He said that Americans were optimistic, progressive and productive, while the prevailing local spirit of the day was sad, static and senile. Comparing the American attitude to life with the European, he said that the latter was selfish, racial, greedy and religiously fanatic.

Nevertheless, Anglo-French control of education succeeded in convincing the educated classes that Americans had no culture of their own and that they had nothing to give to others. On the contrary, they took and lived on imported European culture. When an Egyptian school inspector for English language proposed Emerson's essays for reading in the upper classes of the high schools, the suggestion was judged as foolish. A novel by Robert Louis Stevenson was substituted for it. Up to 1930, the nomination of an American professor of history in the University of Cairo was considered an error by the English Dean.

As far as I know, not a single American book was translated into Arabic till 1935. That does not mean that American thought was unknown in Egypt until then, because we were aware of its history and development. Its masterpieces were well known, but in the original texts. If I am not mistaken, only one American work was known in an Arabic version around 1930—"Walden" by Henry David Thoreau. The reason I think was that some thinkers admired his ideas about civil disobedience, and they wanted to know more about him.

But the common Egyptian had a different idea about the American character. Even before the first world war ordinary people knew that Americans were the people who made ingenious and strange things. Movies had been introduced. In 1920, Cairo had at least two cinemas showing mostly cowboy films and Chaplin shorts. The phonograph was also known. The fountain pen was introduced as the American pen and has kept this denomination. Each curious invention coming from across the Atlantic made people call any curious stratagem "an American trick" even if it came from elsewhere. Even small things like Waterman's Ink were sold under American denomination. Americans

for the ordinary man were all cowboys. It is amusing to note that the leading heroes of the pictures of those days were baptised under Egyptian names: Al-Shaitan (the daredevil), Al Dayjan (the avenger) and so on. Even Buster Keaton had his Arabic name.

But all this was restricted to very limited sectors of the population. Apart from a certain number of the cultural elite, the small number of picture goers and those who really cared to know where things came from, the bulk of the population had not the faintest idea about America and the Americans. America cared little for the outer world and the doctrines of President Woodrow Wilson made scanty impact on world affairs. The general idea was that America was easily bested by the dominant powers of the day—England and France. The general idea was that Americans were busy making millions of dollars and inventing curious things. Nobody ever thought in those days “to look at America,” since Americans wanted others to leave them alone. It is true that we had American schools, but they were few.

It was World War II that gave us and the rest of the world as well a new idea of America in addition to the deep imprint that American military power made on nearly everybody. The personality of President Roosevelt inspired a bright hope for a happy turning point in world politics. Everybody was sure that when America took an active part in world affairs, the terrible pressure that imperialist Europe exercised on the rest of the world would disappear for good.

I do not think that Americans realized the damaging effect of European policies on human morals and understanding. The nineteenth century was an ordeal to the whole world. Before World War II there were only oppressors and oppressed, exploiters and exploited. Half of the world had everything and the other half had nothing, not even the hope of having something some day. I am not going to enumerate the details of colonialism, but I want to allude to the scars it left on human hearts. This allusion helps us to understand the attitude of a land like Egypt towards the West, an attitude which seems inconceivable to Amer-

icans. After the experiences of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century we felt nothing but fear and distrust: fear of falling back to our former sad status and distrust because Europeans never gave us occasion to trust them.

It is enough to remember the sad story of the Suez Canal. Nobody would have thought that a concession, so candidly given by Egypt to the French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps, could turn so badly against the country which gave it. De Lesseps scored the concession for himself, as a friend of the governor of Egypt. But instead of respecting such a grant and exploiting it for the good of the whole world (including Egypt) he hurried with it to France, declared it as a French diplomatic victory and put it under the patronage of the French emperor.

Hence, an innocent act of good will turned into a curse, because France considered the canal a French interest which should be safeguarded. England, France's rival in those days, hurried to the field and began to fight. A decade later Egypt was no more a sovereign country, but an open field for European rivalry and intrigue. In the long run, Egypt lost her independence for about 72 years. No sooner had she regained it than the trouble of Suez began again. Wouldn't it have been better for her and the rest of the world, if she had never given this concession? I do not put the question because of the Suez only. It applies to all sorts of concessions or acts of cooperation with the old nations of Europe. The prevailing idea now is: beware of any agreement with them.

Fortunately, this was not the case with the United States. Ever since we knew Americans, they showed an admirable spirit of equity and justice. In all the agreements they concluded with the Arabs they cared for the rights of others as much as for their own. They reveal a certain sense of justice which the British and especially the French rarely take into consideration when dealing with Oriental or Arab affairs.

Generally speaking, all Egyptians agree on one point concerning America and the Americans: they are sorry that the creation of Israel has disturbed the waters between Egypt and a country worthy of love and

respect. It is well known that all Arabs, including the Egyptians, believe that the United States is the real founder of Israel; they do not blame the Jews of America but the American State itself. They believe that if the United States lets Israel go on her own, she will collapse in a very short time. This collapse will not be a result of war waged against Israel by Arabs, but because she is established by force, on stolen land, and wants to force her neighbors to be her friends for her personal interests. The Arab boycott is her doom and only American help prolongs her days. This is the general idea.

I should add that the creation of Israel is the essential cause of misunderstanding between the Arab world and the West. The Arabs are hostile to pacts with the West (or East) because they are sure that the Baghdad

Pact, for instance, is an indirect way to oblige them to make peace with Israel. They buy arms from the East because they are sure that the West is arming Israel and depriving them of armaments to ensure the existence of Israel.

Israel is the huge rock that blocks the way of complete understanding between Egypt and the West, and particularly the United States. We have a long tradition of mutual respect and consideration. The admiration we have for modern Americans is fairly balanced by the admiration of American Egyptologists for ancient Egypt. We have every reason to hope for better understanding and more intimate collaboration in the future, were it not for this unhappy incident for both of our countries: the opposition of Israel.



"There is a morning of reason rising upon man on the subject of government that has not appeared before. As the barbarism of the present old government expires, the moral conditions of nations with respect to each other will be changed. Man will not be brought up with the savage idea of considering his species as his enemy, because the accident of birth gave the individuals existence in countries distinguished by different names; and as constitutions have always some relation to external as well as to domestic circumstances, the means of benefiting by every change, foreign or domestic, should be a part of every constitution. We already see an alteration in the national disposition of England and France towards each other, which, when we look back to only a few years, is itself a Revolution. Who could have foreseen, or who could have believed, that a French National Assembly would ever have been a popular toast in England, or that a friendly alliance of the two nations should become the wish of either? It shews, that man, were he not corrupted by governments, is naturally the friend of man, and that human nature is not of itself vicious. That spirit of jealousy and ferocity, which the governments of the two countries inspired, and which they rendered subservient to the purpose of taxation, is now yielding to the dictates of reason, interest, and humanity. The trade of courts is beginning to be understood, and the affection of mystery, with all the artificial sorcery by which they imposed upon mankind, is on the decline. . . . For what we can foresee, all Europe may form but one great Republic, and man be free of the whole."

—Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man*, 1791.

World Documents

Atlantic Council Statement on Iceland

The North Atlantic Council's recommendations concerning the continued stationing of United States troops in Iceland follow.

The text was released by the State Department August 3:

The Icelandic Government has formally requested the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization "to review the continued necessity for the facilities and their utilization, and to make recommendations to the two Governments concerning the continuation" of the defense agreement between Iceland and the United States of America within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. This request was made under Article 7 of the agreement in question.

In placing this request before the Council, the Icelandic representative drew attention to the assurances regarding Iceland's special position given at the time the North Atlantic Treaty was negotiated in 1949 and in particular to the fact that it was then recognized that foreign armed forces would not be required in Iceland in time of peace.

In reviewing the situation, the Council have in the first place considered whether international conditions have so far improved as to warrant a basic change in the arrangements made under the defense agreement between Iceland and the United States of America. This agreement was made in 1951, at a time when the international situation had seriously deteriorated, and unprovoked attacks had been launched against the Republic of Korea from which United States forces had just been withdrawn.

It is the Council's regular practice to make thorough surveys of international developments as a basis for assessing common defense needs and strategy in the situation with which they are confronted. In May of this year the foreign ministers of the fifteen member countries met in Paris and, as a result of the survey then made in common, issued a communiqué. In it, they reaffirmed that the reasons which gave rise to the Atlantic alliance had not disappeared, and that Atlantic security remained a basic problem.

It was the sense of the communiqué that the Western powers could not relax their vigilance and that the framework of the common defense remained necessary.

Since the ministerial meeting in May, the Permanent Council have continued to examine the international situation. They have noted recent internal developments in the Soviet Union. These may represent the beginnings of an evolution which would help to bring about a better understanding between the Soviet Union and the free world. It must, however, be recognized that it is as yet too early to assess its true meaning or to conclude that a relaxation of our common defense is warranted.

The Soviet announcement that they intend to reduce the number of men under arms has also been examined, but it is clear that this unilateral action could readily be reversed and that Soviet offensive capabilities are being maintained. Only an effective international agreement on disarmament with controls would make real security possible for all.

In the Council's view, therefore, the conclusions reached at its May meeting hold equally good today. The defensive strength of the alliance has been a major factor in bringing about an improvement in the international situation, and a relaxation of the defense effort now could well reverse this trend. This deterrent to aggression is, therefore, no less necessary today if we are not to fall back, but are to make further progress toward a better and safer world.

Present dangers to peace and to Atlantic security arising from the world political situation are given a sharper edge as a result of developments in new weapons, in new techniques and in the speed and range of modern bombers and submarines. NATO has therefore within the last few years made

a fundamental reassessment of the military assumptions on which Atlantic defense must now be based. This reassessment has shown that, should an aggressor strike, events of the first few hours may well prove decisive.

The far-reaching changes made necessary in defense planning, especially to guard against surprise attack, have greatly increased the importance of facilities in strategic areas, and of their maintenance in a state of readiness. This applies not only to Iceland but also to other NATO countries which in recent years have provided necessary facilities, maintained and manned by the forces of their partners in the alliance. None of these governments deems that the present situation justifies any change in these arrangements.

These new circumstances have a particular bearing on the special situation of Iceland. Among the fifteen members of the alliance, Iceland alone does not maintain armed forces of its own. If the Icelandic Government should deprive itself of the protection provided by defense forces in the country supplied by its NATO partners, it would be possible for an aggressor to seize control of Iceland with very small forces, either airborne or of the seaborne commando type, before effective assistance could be rendered. Iceland would thus incur the risk of occupation and the extinction of its freedom.

It should be borne in mind that an aggressor planning to attack the alliance would in such conditions be strongly tempted, as a preliminary for such an attack, to seize an unprotected Iceland because of its geographical position. Action necessary to evict the invader would in all probability involve great destruction and loss of life.

The freedom and security of Iceland are, in themselves, a major objective and responsibility of the Atlantic alliance. They also have great importance for the freedom and security of all NATO members.

Iceland in enemy hands would represent a great threat to the security of the Atlantic area. The country lies across the natural line of sea and air communications between North America and the European members of NATO. It represents a key position for the defense of these countries against air

attack, for the safe conveying of supplies by sea, and for the movement of defensive fighter aircraft between North America and Europe.

The security of the member countries of NATO would be seriously threatened if these facilities were unavailable in the critical days and hours immediately preceding and following an attack. These considerations underline the importance in present conditions of the stationing in Iceland of armed forces to defend the country and to maintain facilities in a state of readiness and manned by trained personnel.

The Council wish to affirm that the defense considerations set forth above, which represent the views of the high military authorities of the alliance, have their full support.

The North Atlantic Treaty expresses the determination of its members to safeguard their freedom, for which purpose they have "resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense."

As allies working together, the members of the Atlantic community are called on to take such steps in the light of prevailing conditions as are necessary to help in the common defense, as well as to avoid actions which may render attacks more likely or more dangerous for their partners. The Council wish to record their appreciation of the loyal and steadfast participation of Iceland in this work of the alliance in the past seven years. This has strengthened the unity which has been a major factor in preserving peace during this period, and is still the main hope for future peace and progress.

In the view of the Council, the present international situation has not improved to such an extent that defense forces are no longer required in Iceland. Under present circumstances, the withdrawal of United States forces, now in Iceland on behalf of the alliance as a whole, would leave the country completely undefended. A major deterrent to aggression in the North Atlantic area would no longer exist and a gap would be opened in the chain of defense which maintains our security.

It is the tangible and visible evidence of forces and installations in being, in place

and ready, which constitutes an effective deterrent against aggression. An effective deterrent is our greatest safeguard against the outbreak of war.

The North Atlantic Council, having carefully reviewed the political and military situation, find a continuing need for the stationing of forces in Iceland and for the maintenance of the facilities in a state of readiness. The Council earnestly recom-

mend that the defense agreement between Iceland and the United States of America be continued in such form and with such practical arrangements as will maintain the strength of the common defense.

The Council trust that in the proposed bilateral talks between Iceland and the United States of America full weight will be given to the Council's findings and to the considerations set forth in this review.

Statements on the Middle East

Israeli Statement on the Invasion of Egypt

The Israeli Foreign Ministry's statement of October 29 on the invasion of Egypt follows:

Israel this evening took security measures to eliminate the Egyptian fedayeen [commando] bases in the Sinai peninsula. These units, organized some two years ago by the Egyptian Government as a part of the Egyptian army to spread terror in Israel by acts of indiscriminate murder, mining and sabotage, were quiescent for a few weeks on the Egyptian border during the period of Egypt's deep involvement with the maritime nations of the world on the Suez Canal issue.

With the conclusion of the [United Nations] Security Council deliberations, Colonel Nasser [President Gamal Abdel Nasser] felt himself immediately free to authorize the fedayeen units to renew their incursions into Israel territory. Within the last week, twenty-four Israeli casualties, dead and wounded, were caused by mines planted by the fedayeen in the southern Negev. Today, following the earlier capture of two other gangs at Erez and Sdeh Boker, respectively, a further group was apprehended in Israel territory by the Israel security forces.

Colonel Nasser has persistently declared that despite the explicit provisions of the Israel armistice agreement his country remains in a state of war with Israel. He has carried on a war of limited liability.

It is not Israel which has sent murder gangs into Egypt; it is Egypt which week after week and month after month sent such gangs into Israel.

It is not Israel which has sought to strangle Egypt's economy and life by illegal blockade of the Suez Canal and Akaba; it is Egypt which in its pursuit of a one-sided state of war has done these things.

It is not Israel which has sought to encompass Egypt with a ring of steel with the announced and flaunted purpose at the appropriate moment of annihilating her; it is Egypt which has glorified in this effort, crowned a few days ago by a Syrian-Jordan-Egyptian military command under the Egyptian Commander in Chief.

On top of all this, Colonel Nasser has ignored his international obligations under the charter of the United Nations, has flouted his duty under the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and the Security Council resolution of Sept. 1, 1951, to permit free passage through the Suez Canal for the vessels of all nations at all times.

And most recently, after the resolution of the Security Council adopted barely two weeks ago once again reaffirming the duty to afford such free passage to all, the Egyptian Government has again reiterated its determination to block the passage of Israel shipping through the canal.

Israel has done all in its power to achieve peace with Egypt. Its leaders have declared their readiness at any time and at any place to meet with Egyptian representatives and to discuss a settlement of the mutual prob-

lems of the two countries. The proffered hand of peace has always been brutally and even derisively rejected. Egypt's response has been to heighten the propaganda of hate and the hostile activities directed against the very existence of Israel.

All this has been a central part of the comprehensive plan of subversion and imperial-

ist expansion pursued by the Egyptian dictatorship throughout the countries of the Middle East and of the African continent.

Israel seeks a relationship with the people of Egypt based upon mutual respect of rights, free from the threat of attack on its citizens, of blockade and of interference with its communications whether by land or sea.

French Statement on Egyptian Aid to Algeria

The French statement protesting Egyptian aid to Algerian rebels was presented to the Security Council by the French representative, Bernard Cornut-Gentile, on October 29. The text follows:

I shall confine myself today to a statement of the facts which led the French Government to request that the matter of military aid given the Algerian rebels by the Egyptian Government be placed on the agenda. In accordance with the rules of procedure the French delegation reserves the right to take up the substance of the question after our agenda has been adopted.

On October 15, a plane of the French Naval Air Force spotted, off the Algerian port of Nemours, a ship flying no flag and of suspicious appearance. Its course was followed by radar. After stopping for a moment, the vessel slowly resumed its course and entered the territorial waters where it seemed to be making for the coastline. It was then that the French Navy went into action. The ship changed its course. It was stopped on the morning of October 16 off the Cap des Trois-Fourches so that its colors might be determined.

A search by the French naval authorities disclosed that the vessel contained a large cargo of arms and munitions. These are enumerated in the annex to document S/2689 distributed on October 25.

In addition, six passengers without proper papers were on board. It was subsequently learned that these were six French nationals of Algeria who had studied terrorist tactics in Cairo.

The inquiry and the very statements of the ship's captain reveal that the vessel sailing under the name of Athos had left the port of Alexandria during the night of October 3-4, piloted by an officer of the Egyptian Navy, and bound for the military base of Alexandria, where seven carloads of arms and munitions were on the dock. This ma-

terial was loaded on the ship by 150 soldiers in uniform.

The Athos left the port of Alexandria on the morning of October 4, as indicated by the sailing permit found on board. According to its log, the ship was bound for Italy. Sailing at a maximum speed of 7 to 8 knots, it set its course toward Sicily, then, leaving Sardinia on the starboard, headed toward the Balearic Islands. The trip from Sicily to the Balearic Islands took two days at an average speed of 7 knots. From the Balearic Islands the Athos continued on its course toward Almeria, on the Spanish coast, then toward the banks of Ochaela, whence it steered for the islet of Alboran and the Cap des Trois-Fourches off which it was searched.

Between its departure from the Alexandria military base and the time that it was stopped and searched, the Athos did not put in at any port.

According to the statements of the crew, the place at which the ship was hailed must have been between the Baie des Boufades, near the Cap de l'Agua, on the frontier between Morocco and Algeria.

The arms were destined for Algerian rebel groups stationed in the region of Tlemcen.

Those are the facts. They are clear and explicit and do not need to be enlarged upon further. From this it is evident, beyond any possible doubt, that sufficient arms to equip more than 1,500 men and worth more than 2,000,000,000 francs (\$5,700,000) of contraband goods, could have been loaded at an Egyptian military base by uniformed soldiers and shipped to groups of rebel French citizens.

The responsibility of the Egyptian state in this affair is evident. Its intervention in

the rebellion in Algeria has been proved.

My Government feels that we are confronted with a deliberate act directed against French sovereignty, in violation of the fundamental rules of international law concerning noninterference in the internal affairs of

another state.

The French delegation requests the Security Council to consider this matter immediately, in order to put an end to a situation which, if continued, is likely to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

British-French Resolution on the Suez Canal Users Association

The text of the French and British joint draft resolution on the Suez as presented to the Security Council on October 5 follows.

The Security Council,

Recognizing that the action of the Government of Egypt in unilaterally bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal, which was confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888, has prejudiced the rights and guarantees enjoyed by users of the canal under that system, thereby creating a situation which endangers the free and open passage of shipping through the canal, without distinction of flag, as laid down by that convention;

Considering that this action was designed to, and did, subject to the Egyptian national interest, and to exclusive Egyptian control, the operation of an international public service which was set up for the benefit of all nations;

Considering that the action of the Egyptian Government is contrary to the principles of respect for international obligations and the interdependence of nations;

Considering that the situation created by this action, which has gravely impaired the confidence necessary and the operation of an international service, is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

Considering that, for these reasons, the rights and interests of users of the Suez Canal cannot be left in the hands of a purely national organization;

Noting that a conference to discuss this situation was called in London on 16 August 1956, and that eighteen of the twenty-two states attending that conference, who between them are responsible for over 90 per cent of the traffic using the canal, put forward proposals to the Egyptian Government;

Noting with regret the refusal of the Egyptian Government to negotiate on the basis

of these proposals;

Noting that a second conference held in London from 19 to 21 September 1956 provided for the establishment of an association designed to assist its members in the exercise of their rights as users of the Suez Canal in consonance with the 1888 Convention and with due regard for the rights of Egypt;

Noting that, in the view of the Governments which participated in this conference, the proposals of the eighteen powers continue to offer a fair basis for a peaceful solution of the Suez Canal problem, taking into account the rights and interests of the user nations as well as those of Egypt;

Noting that on 1 October 1956 the Suez Canal Users Association was inaugurated;

1. Reaffirms the principle of the freedom of navigation of the Suez Canal in accordance with the Suez Canal Convention of 1888;

2. Considers that the rights which all users of the Suez Canal enjoyed under the system upon which the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 was based, should be safeguarded, and the necessary guarantees restored;

3. Endorses the proposals of the eighteen states as suitably designed to bring about an adjustment and solution of the Suez Canal question by peaceful means and in conformity with justice;

4. Recommends that the Government of Egypt should cooperate by negotiation in working out, on the basis of these proposals, a system of operation to be applied to the Suez Canal;

5. Recommends that the Government of Egypt should, pending the outcome of such negotiations, cooperate with the Suez Canal Users Association.

Received At Our Desk

Military History

ARMS AND MEN. A STUDY IN AMERICAN HISTORY. BY WALTER MILLIS. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956. 365 pages, notes and index, \$5.75).

MEN IN ARMS. A HISTORY OF WARFARE AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN SOCIETY. BY RICHARD A. PRESTON, SYDNEY F. WISE AND HERMAN O. WERNER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. 340 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.50).

DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY. THE SOLDIER AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. BY ALFRED VAGTS. (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956. 530 pages and bibliography, \$8.75).

As the authors of *MEN IN ARMS* point out: "The increasing extent to which modern war involves civilians makes it imperative that they should study military history and the history of warfare in relation to society. . . . The degree to which civilian life is affected by war, and in which civilian energies are absorbed by it, makes it essential that civilian leaders of society; whether business men, engineers, manufacturers, administrators, clergymen or politicians, must study and understand warfare."

To this end, several studies of war and the men who are responsible for war have recently appeared. Both *MEN IN ARMS* and *ARMS AND MEN* restate the dilemma of the twentieth century: the dilemma posed by the development of thermonuclear warfare. *MEN IN ARMS* traces the history of warfare and its effects on society from the classical wars of Greece and Rome to the current Cold War. Feudal warfare, modern warfare and modern armies, the limited warfare of the eighteenth century, the "illusion of limited warfare" in the nineteenth

century, and the total wars of the twentieth century are described. Illustrations and maps add to the informative content of this study. The authors point out that "development in warfare has been closely connected with the process of historical change: "Man's social, political, economic and cultural progress has been affected both for good and for ill by the incidence and impact of armed conflict." War, as they see it, "is intimately involved with the whole historical process." Despite the tremendous difficulties involved in modern war, the authors see little prospect for disarmament. "War might be abolished either by the creation of a world empire, or by a voluntary system of collective security little short of a complete world federation; and neither of these is in sight." As an effort to set warfare into the perspective of social history for the interested lay reader, this readable study is successful.

ARMS AND MEN picks up the military story at the time of the American Revolution, pointing out again the changing concept from limited warfare by professional soldiers to the modern all-out total warfare of the thermonuclear bomb. Walter Millis traces what he calls aptly "The Democratization of War," the influences of the industrial, managerial and scientific revolutions, the mechanization of war, the "Hypertrophy of War" today and finally, "The Future of War." The industrial, managerial and scientific revolutions were to bring the American people through two World Wars, to conscription, to tremendous changes in the peacetime living habits of the civilian, to thermonuclear warfare. As Millis sees it, 1948 "represented a major divide in American military thought." Prior to this point, it was generally agreed that the American people would not countenance atomic

bombs and weapons as instruments of warfare except under dire national peril. By 1948, on the other hand, "it was plain that the atomic arsenal had entered American thought as an appropriate instrument of policy for the future."

What is the future of war in our world society? The author does not attempt an answer, although he points out that "as even defense seemed more and more to imply total destruction," the usefulness of military force as an instrument of national policy is questionable. "The military policies being followed by our own and other governments are often self-contradictory; they are unclear in purpose and uncertain in effect. They are enormously burdensome. . . . These policies, adopted everywhere in the name of 'national security' have spread a corroding sense of insecurity through all the more advanced people of the earth, nor have they offered clear hope or promise to the poorer and more backward. And they have brought us within possible distance of the extinction of civilization, if not of humanity itself." "This extraordinary situation," as Walter Millis terms it, is worth thought and study; his well-phrased analysis of American military history is a tremendous contribution to the thoughtful citizen.

DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY. *The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations*, the first of the "Topical Studies in International Relations" to be published by Columbia's Institute of War and Peace Studies, is a more ambitious and detailed description of the relationships between war and diplomacy, between soldiers and diplomats. Dr. Vagts discusses soldiers in diplomatic posts, diplomats, foreign offices and general staffs, military conventions and missions, armed demonstrations, preventive wars, mobilization and many other topics. The material is arranged topically rather than chronologically; footnotes are liberally added; archival materials and memoirs underlie the study. The resulting detailed research monograph is a scholarly contribution to the general field of military history, but with less appeal for the lay reader.

Government and History

LIFE SINCE 1900. BY CHARLES FURTH. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. 167 pages, \$3.50).

After a nostalgic chapter on "A Lost World" of the Victorians, this keen author describes social and economic conditions for the various classes in England prior to World War I, between the wars and during World War II. Introducing his chapter on "The World Today," he comments that "This is on the whole an unpleasant book, and now we come to its most unpleasant part; but to be honest some reference to the moral breakdown of the period seems inescapable." Like so many other observers of the human animal, he is at a loss to explain the degeneration of Western morals that led the Germans to condone policies of brutal extermination, for example. This small historical study offers a farsighted view of English history, not detailed or scholarly but stimulating nonetheless.

TRIAL BALANCE. THE EDUCATION OF AN AMERICAN. BY ALAN VALENTINE. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1956. 283 pages, \$4.50).

Writing of himself in the third person as "Angus," Alan Valentine describes America as he writes of his own life for the first half of the twentieth century. Former president of the University of Rochester, ECA mission chief to the Netherlands, first chief of the Economic Stabilization Agency, "Angus" has been a not unimportant figure on the American scene. As he explains in his preface, "He was attracted by the idea of carrying forward the education of an American from the point where Henry Adams left off." He compares himself with Adams less favorably than circumstances warrant; his "Education of an American" provides a well-written, often amusing and informative picture of American life.

THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW DEAL. BY DANIEL R. FUSFELD. (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1956. 337 pages, notes, bibliography, and index, \$5.00).

This author attempts a difficult study, tracing the development of the economic thought and policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The development of FDR's belief in a limited welfare state is interpreted as the expansion of the idea of *noblesse oblige* of the Hudson River gentry to meet the needs of an industrial society. The economic measures of the New Deal are examined in reference to FDR's political philosophy. The author has evaluated Roosevelt's contradictory and obviously political statements.

His account of Roosevelt's schooling, especially in the field of economics, at Groton and Harvard, is interesting in contrast to other recent books which tend to disparage the influence of FDR's early education.

HIMALAYAN CIRCUIT. By G. D. KHOSLA. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1956. 233 pages and map, \$4.50).

A High Court Judge of India traveled through the Himalayas, drawn by his love of beauty and his curiosity about the mountain people and their way of life. His diary tells of the trials and tribulations of the journey and the amazing folk of the high valleys and hills, including those who have never washed, Buddhist monks, village headmen. His scenic descriptions are especially good. Mr. Khosla is a talented reporter of the unusual and the beautiful.

MR. VESSEY OF ENGLAND. Edited by BRIAN WATERS. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956. 184 pages, \$2.95).

To travel 11,000 miles on the American continent in the year 1859 took a good deal of fortitude. Mr. John Henry Vessey, a 31-year-old bachelor, a gentleman and a traveler, made a 12-week trip from Quebec to Georgia and Alabama, through the western prairies and the seaboard cities—and kept a careful journal. Hotels he termed better than those of England; of railroads he wrote: "Their fares appear low, their accommodation is on a par with

it." Yet he felt that English railroads could copy our baggage checking system. Mr. Vessey even called on President Buchanan at the White House. An interesting young man with an interesting journal, this Mr. Vessey.

FREEDOM IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY. By SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON. (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1956. 156 pages with appendix and bibliography, \$3.50).

Samuel Eliot Morison, Professor Emeritus of History at Harvard, discusses three aspects of freedom—the political, economic and academic. He traces the history of political freedom from pre-revolutionary times to the present and contrasts political liberty in the United States with that of Canada. Professor Morison's analysis of economic freedom is pertinent; he asserts that our free enterprise system is not to be equated with *laissez-faire*. Free enterprise, in this author's definition, did not perish with the advent of the New Deal. This "economic Macbeth is still Thane of Glamis." The passages on the Fair Trade Laws, with which the author stands at great odds, are trenchant writing.

The third section, "Academic Freedom," offers a brief history of academic freedom, "the newest of the freedoms," defined as "freedom of the professor to teach or to do research, freedom of the student to learn, and freedom of the professor to take an active part in political and social controversies."

This is far from a reassuring study, for the author deplores the mediocrity and orthodoxy which have been inculcated into our universities and colleges; the student body as well as the faculty has been affected. "A restoration of *laissez-faire* (which one academic punster called 'lazy fare') in student activities would be healthy fare for most of them. Only the weak would suffer; and our entire educational system is too much geared to weaklings."

In concluding, the hope is offered that "no danger is great enough to cause us to lay the armor of freedom aside as obsolete, or to turn it in for a dictator,

armed with an atomic bomb and supported by secret police." We are reminded that "though we are living in a dangerous era, let us not forget that there were other times that tried men's souls."

A JEFFERSON PROFILE. Selected and arranged with an introduction by SAUL K. PADOVER. (New York: John Day, 1956. 359 pages with index and chronology, \$5.00).

From this selection of letters emerges the cultivated personality of Thomas Jefferson, whose discourses range from the beauty of Lake George to "principles of government." This is an unwieldy collection; the letters are arranged chronologically, the only trace of a correspondence being in Jefferson's letters to John Adams. The letters written between 1809 to 1826 which are collected in Part 8, "Last Years," when Jefferson had retired from private life, provide the reader with the ruminations of a mellowed, octogenarian Jefferson. These letters are entertaining reading; Jefferson is never disappointing in his epigrammatic gems.

THE EARLY CHURCHILLS. By A. L. ROWSE. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. 378 pages and index, \$6.50).

The familiar figure of Sir Winston is esteemed by the entire modern world. The family that produced him produced other able figures; at least one of these, John, first Duke of Marlborough, ranked with the present Churchill as a soldier and statesman. A. L. Rowse tells of these earlier members of a famous family.

The first Sir Winston Churchill figured during the Cromwell wars. His children, Arabella, George and John, were among the most important figures in England through the reigns of several monarchs. John and his famous wife Sarah were on the most intimate terms with Queen Anne. Mr. Rowse details the story of this friendship and the mutual resentment that arose from it. His chief concern is with the figure of John, who became the

most famous soldier-general in Europe. He rallied the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV's aggressions and led its armies in a never-broken series of victories. In politics, the first Duke of Marlborough met his only defeats.

A. L. Rowse is one of our finest living historians, writing with a tremendous enthusiasm and knowledge. His histories are always readable; his historic personages are alive amid their contemporaries and surroundings.

THE TUDORS. By CHRISTOPHER NORRIS. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. 202 pages, and index, \$4.50).

Christopher Norris has in effect recreated the characters of the Tudor kings and queens to show the impact of their personalities on English history. As an aid to this end, a large collection of contemporary portraits reveals almost as much about the personalities as the text. The portraits of Mary are particularly revealing. Elizabeth I, as the author sees her, approached genius more closely than any other occupant of the throne; but she was always a woman. As the carrier who called three times before he could collect her baggage declared: "Now I see the Queen is a woman as well as my wife."

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. 1955. EDITED BY PAUL ZINNER. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. 484 pages and index, \$6.00).

Here is the seventeenth volume in the series of annual Documents on American Foreign Relations inaugurated by the World Peace Foundation in 1939 and published since 1952 under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations. "Documents" as defined in this volume include speeches, letters, reports to Congress, and statements, as well as communiqués, agreements, resolutions and the like, some texts printed in full, and some as excerpts. The material is arranged topically, beginning with statements of United States Principles and Policies.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Atomic Energy Agency

October 9—U. N. members refuse to accept Communist China, East Germany and Soviet satellites as members of the international atomic energy agency.

October 22—82 states agree on terms for the establishment of the atoms-for-peace agency, to be known as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agency's board of governors will have authority to send inspectors to recipient nations to see that neither fissionable materials nor their by-products are being used for military purposes.

October 26—The U. S. will give 11,000 pounds of uranium 235 to the International Atomic Energy Agency, promises President Eisenhower.

Middle Eastern Crisis (See also The Suez Canal)

October 3—Talks between Iraq and Jordan on Iraqi military aid to Jordan are reported to have broken down.

October 4—In an ambush close to the Jordanian border six miles south of Sodom five Israelis are killed and one is seriously wounded.

October 8—Israel accuses Egypt of blocking the passage of 103 ships of at least 14 countries from passage through the Suez.

October 9—Israel reveals that four-fifths of the blocked bank accounts of Arab refugees have been released.

October 10—Diplomatic sources in Washington disclose that the U. S. and Great Britain would approve the movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan to help maintain order there. It is understood that these troops would not go near Israel's borders. Iraq has never signed an armistice with Israel.

October 11—Israelis and Jordanians engage in an artillery duel.

It is revealed that 66 persons lost their lives in an Israeli reprisal raid October 10.

October 12—Great Britain warns Israel orally that she will fulfill her obligations to Jordan under the 1948 British-Jordan treaty of alliance and mutual defense.

October 15—Jordan asks the Security Council at the U. N. to consider "acts of aggression" by Israel.

October 16—The Jordanian Chief of Staff declares that if Israeli aggression necessitates such moves, British jet aircraft and Iraqi troops are available.

October 17—Premier David Ben-Gurion tells Parliament that "the Egyptian Fascist dictator" constitutes the greatest danger to Israel.

October 18—U. N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld warns Israel not to boycott U. N. truce machinery.

October 19—Jordan asks the U. N. Security Council to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against Israel.

October 21—Three Israeli soldiers are reported killed and twenty-seven are wounded in mine blasts on the Egyptian border.

October 22—Jordan elects an anti-Western, pro-Egyptian Parliament, including at least three Communists.

October 25—Jordan, Egypt and Syria sign a military agreement providing for an Egyptian general to take command of their joint forces in the event of a war with Israel.

Israel assures the U. N. Security Council that she will never start a war, but she will not "sit back and suffer the consequences of a unilateral Arab belligerency."

October 29—An Israeli military force invades Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. An Israeli Foreign Ministry statement says that the

action has been taken "to eliminate the Egyptian Fedayeen [commando squad] bases in the Sinai Peninsula."

Egyptian authorities announce that no clash has yet taken place between Israeli and Egyptian forces.

The United States requests an emergency meeting of the Security Council to deal with the Mid-East crisis.

October 30—President Nasser warns Great Britain and France that Egypt will fight to keep the Suez Canal. Great Britain and France issue an ultimatum that they will send troops into the Suez unless Israel and Egypt withdraw 10 miles from the Suez Canal and cease fire by 11:30 p.m. (EST). The ultimatum is rejected by General Nasser.

Aerial warfare commences between Israel and Egypt.

President Eisenhower protests to Britain and France against their ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to stop fighting and withdraw 10 miles from the Suez Canal.

Britain and France reject a United States proposal, supported by Russia, in the Security Council that Egypt and Israel cease fighting, that Israeli troops be immediately withdrawn, and that "all powers" desist from force or threats of force. Later, Britain and France veto a Soviet resolution for a cease-fire, which omitted the controversial clause, asking "all powers" to refrain from the use of force.

Cairo reports that British and French planes bomb military targets and large cities in Egypt, in an attempt to force Egypt to evacuate its troops from the Suez.

October 31—Israel agrees to the British-French ultimatum provided Egypt responds affirmatively.

British and French troops on Cyprus are ready to move into Egypt as soon as the order for such action is given.

The Security Council votes to call an emergency session of the General Assembly to consider the "actions undertaken against Egypt."

President Eisenhower of the United States asserts that his country will in no way become involved in the Middle East

hostilities. However, he asserts that disapproval of actions taken in the Middle East does not lessen United States friendship with the countries involved.

The Suez Canal (See also Middle Eastern Crisis)

October 1—Fifteen nations set up the Suez Canal Users Association.

October 4—Egyptian authorities block local currency for British shipping agents at Port Said.

October 7—Britain urges that the U. S. stop its ships from paying tolls to the Egyptian-controlled Suez authority.

October 8—Egypt and the Soviet Union again refuse to accept international operation of the canal.

October 13—Britain and France urge the Security Council to approve international operation of the canal.

The Security Council refuses to hear Israeli and Arab views on the Suez issue at this time.

Israel asks equal rights with other nations in any settlement of the Suez crisis.

October 14—Britain asks the U. S. to help start operation of the Suez Canal Users Association without the completion of organizational details.

October 17—British and French spokesmen agree to ask Egypt to negotiate on the basis of international operation of the canal unless she can offer a system meeting the same requirements with similar guarantees.

October 19—Eyvind Bartels, Denmark's Consul General in New York, is appointed Administrator of the Suez Canal Users Association.

October 24—India releases a revised plan for operation of the Suez Canal in an attempt to reopen negotiations between Egypt and the Western powers.

United Nations (See also Middle Eastern Crisis)

October 1—The U. N. receives a request from Asian and African members for a General Assembly discussion of the Algerian question.

The Netherlands formally asks the U. N. to consider Indonesia's repudiation of \$170 million in debts to the Netherlands.

October 22—Scientists from 15 countries, members of the U. N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, begin a study of fall-out data.

October 27—Great Britain, France and the United States appeal to the United Nations Security Council to consider Soviet armed intervention in the Hungarian revolt. They state that the fundamental freedoms of Hungary, guaranteed by the Paris Peace Treaty, 1947, are violated by such intervention. Spain also requests the United Nations consideration of the Polish problem and the use of Soviet military might there.

October 28—The Security Council agrees by a vote of 9 to 1 (Yugoslavia abstaining) to discuss the Hungarian crisis.

October 29—France charges, in the Security Council, that Egypt is shipping contraband to the Algerians.

AFGHANISTAN

October 28—Under the arms aid pacts between Kabul and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union has presented the Afghans with 11 MIG jet fighters.

AUSTRIA

October 27—Austria offers asylum to all Hungarian refugees who flee across the border.

BOLIVIA

October 20—Bolivia's new government under President Hernan Siles Zuazo wins two important rounds in its currency reform and stabilization program: the government halts two in the series of "wildcat strikes" impairing Bolivian industry.

BRAZIL

October 10—President Kubitschek of Brazil submits to Congress the new press bill permitting the seizure of newspapers in

times of public disorder. At the same time the Brazilian Communications Minister, Lucio Meira, subjects radio and television broadcasts to highly restrictive regulations.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Australia

October 18—To improve the working of the Administration, Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies reshuffles his Cabinet, moving the ministers for the Army, Navy and Air Force out of the Cabinet to strengthen the Defense Minister's position.

Great Britain

October 1—Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Labor party, charges that the British government has not given a clear assurance that it will not resort to force in the Suez without U. N. authorization.

October 2—Aneurin Bevan, Left-wing Labor party leader, is elected party treasurer.

Harold Macmillan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Prime Minister Anthony Eden discuss a proposal to set up a free trade region including West Europe, Britain and possibly the other nations of the Commonwealth.

October 18—Minister of Defense Sir Walter Monckton resigns for reasons of health; Antony Head, former Secretary for War, is named to succeed him.

October 31—The House of Commons by a majority of 52 endorses the government's intervention in the Suez if necessary. Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd asserts that because the Security Council is blocked by the Soviet veto, Britain and France must personally protect peace and property in the Suez.

India

October 2—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru flies to Ahmadabad to begin campaigning for the country-wide elections tentatively set for February, 1957.

October 15—India suggests that the pro-

posed international atomic energy agency be forbidden to give aid to any state with a program for developing military uses of nuclear energy.

Two hundred thousand low-caste Hindus—"untouchables"—become Buddhists in a mass conversion ceremony.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Hong Kong

October 12—After two days of disorder in which some 50,000 Chinese rioted, 44 are reported killed. The worst Hong Kong violence in a generation began with a minor incident, became anti-British and then anti-white, and flared into interfaction fighting between Left and Right wing movements.

October 13—Rioting ends in Hong Kong after thousands of arrests; full blame is placed on "Chinese secret societies and lawless elements" of society.

Kenya

October 21—Self-styled Field Marshal Sir Dedan Kimathi, leader of the Mau Mau terrorists, is shot and captured.

Singapore

October 12—The Government closes the two largest Chinese private schools after three days of Communist-led student rioting. The students took over the two schools after the Government took steps to purge the schools of communism.

October 14—The Leftist People's Action party demands immediate general elections.

October 26—Rioting spreads: seven are reported dead and 51 wounded.

The Government imposes a curfew; British troops stand by in case of "emergency."

BURMA

October 2—Premier U Ba Swe of Burma announces that Communist China has agreed to withdraw its troops from Burma and to abide by the borderline established in the 1941 treaty.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

October 15—Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, in talks with First Secretary of the Polish Communist party Edward Ochab, disapproves of Russia's efforts to establish a single road to communism.

COLOMBIA

October 12—Minister of Finance Luis Morales Gomez announces an austerity program to meet Colombia's economic crisis; imports are to be rigidly limited.

EGYPT

October 17—President Nasser repeats his statement that Russia will aid Egypt in the construction of the Aswan High Dam; he specifically credits this offer to the Soviet ambassador to Egypt and not to Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov.

October 28—Soviet arms equipment sent to Egypt during the last 14 months under the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian arms deal has helped to create the strongest and most up-to-date Egyptian army in modern times.

FRANCE

October 18—To help France build up her dollar reserves, the International Monetary Fund grants France the right to purchase up to \$262.5 million from the fund.

October 19—The French government demands an explanation from Egypt following the seizure by the French Navy of a ship carrying arms consigned to Algerian rebels. The ship was loaded by Egyptian soldiers at Alexandria.

October 22—The French seize five top Algerian rebel leaders en route to Tunis after their conference with the Sultan of Morocco in Rabat yesterday. The French crew manning the plane accede to a French police order to land at the Maison Blanche military airport where French police take the Algerians prisoner. The five rebel leaders were on their way to a conference with France and Morocco on the Algerian situation.

October 29—The French government formally charges the 5 Algerian rebels with treason, an offense punishable by death. Algerians are French citizens and hence subject to charges of treason.

October 31—386 members of the French National Assembly vote in favor of the Government taking military action in the Suez. In his speech to the Assembly, Premier Mollet condemns General Nasser for provoking Israeli retaliation.

GERMANY (West)

October 4—An explosion in an office building in Hamburg reveals a large scale arms export business to the Middle East and North Africa.

October 6—Four West German cabinet ministers resign over a leak in secret talks concerning a tentative cabinet reorganization in an effort to precipitate a needed cabinet revision.

October 10—The United States, Britain and France in a series of notes to the Soviet Union urge the resumption of talks on German reunification.

October 16—Dr. Konrad Adenauer announces several changes in his cabinet, including the appointment of a new defense minister. The number of ministers is reduced from 19 to 15; Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano has not received the expected additional honor of the vice-chancellorship.

October 17—Germany's new defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, is instructed by Chancellor Adenauer to inform the NATO council that Germany cannot meet its manpower commitments for 1957. Germany's slow build-up of armed strength is to be stretched out over a longer period.

October 27—France and Germany sign an agreement turning the Saar Basin over to West Germany. Germany offers to support France's pet project, the canalization of the Moselle River to connect the Lorraine steel industry with the Ruhr Valley.

HAVANA

October 29—Nine revolutionists, supporters

of the government of former President Carlos Prío Socarras, seek refuge in the Haitian embassy where they are shot by Cuba's police in a gun fight. Cuban police round up all opponents to the government of President Fulgencio Batista following the assassination of the military intelligence service chief, Col. Antonio Blanco Rico.

HONDURAS

October 7—Police fire into a crowd of election demonstrators during the election of Honduras' Constituent Assembly. The demonstration occurs before the headquarters of the Liberal party, the only serious opposition to the incumbent National Union party.

October 21—A combination of military leaders effects the first bloodless coup in the history of Honduras, forcing Dr. Julio Lozano Dias of the National Union Party to resign as Chief of State in favor of a military junta.

October 22—The military junta under Col. Hector Caraccioli is endorsed by all political parties who pledge themselves to the formation of a democratic government.

October 24—The elections for the Constituent Assembly are voided by the military junta.

HUNGARY

October 4—Hungary receives an emergency credit grant of \$25 million from the Soviet Union.

October 6—200,000 Hungarians march before the coffins of Laszlo Rajk and three other top-ranking Communists who are now declared innocent of treason and given reburial as part of Russia's de-Stalinization program.

October 13—Former Premier Imre Nagy is readmitted to the Hungarian Communist party and it is hinted that he may be returned to office. Mr. Nagy was ousted from the party over a year ago on charges of Titoism.

October 21—Hungarian university students demand more freedom and an easing of

Communist restrictions on the press, travel, literature and so forth; they threaten to strike if these demands are not met.

October 22—It is announced today that at a meeting last weekend in Gyor the withdrawal of Soviet troops was publicly requested.

Hungary and Yugoslavia agree to reopen Communist party ties between the two countries.

October 23—Police fire on Hungarians assembled before a Budapest radio station building as they attempt to force their way in when their delegation sent into the building fails to reappear.

October 24—Imre Nagy is restored to Hungary's Premiership. Soviet forces are used in an attempt to halt the anti-Russian rioting in Budapest.

October 25—Hungarians continue to resist Soviet tanks as the anti-Soviet rioting enters its third day. Erno Gero, a loyal Stalinist, is ousted as head of the Hungarian Communist party, in an attempt to calm the rioters. Mr. Gero is succeeded by Janos Kadar.

A Soviet tank opens fire on a crowd of peaceful demonstrators whose only weapons are flags.

October 26—Rioting continues in its fourth day. The rioters demand that the new government of Imre Nagy grant the 16 demands that it tried to present peaceably on October 23.

October 27—Hungarian rebels hold Western Hungary along the 160 mile Austrian-Hungarian border.

The Hungarian revolt is spreading throughout the country and growing stronger. The Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist party outlines a program similar to that of the new Polish Communist government. The Central Committee pledges itself to work for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from strong points as soon as the rioting is quelled.

In an attempt to widen his regime, Premier Nagy admits two new members into his cabinet. They are Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs, leaders of the outlawed Smallholders party. The majority of the Cabinet remains Communist.

October 30—Soviet troops leave Budapest.

Premier Imre Nagy promises free elections and an early end to one-party dictatorship in a broadcast to the Hungarian people.

The Soviet Union announces its willingness to withdraw all its troops from Poland and Hungary if those nations think such action necessary, provided that all Warsaw Pact countries (Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany and Russia) agree.

October 31—Cardinal Mindszenty is released from prison where he has been held since 1946 on charges of treason.

ICELAND

October 1—At the meeting between the United States and Iceland to discuss the withdrawal of United States troops, Iceland rejects the United States timetable and insists that the 18 month period for the withdrawal of troops began on August 1 when Iceland notified the United States and NATO that she desired this step.

INDONESIA

October 9—Several top Indonesian army officials are arrested on suspicion of plotting to set up a military junta and to overthrow the present government.

ITALY

October 2—Italy and Libya sign a treaty solving the problems arising from Libya's becoming independent in 1951.

October 19—The Christian Democratic party, in power since the end of World War II, ends its sixth national congress with a victory for the moderates. Both Right and Left wings are defeated.

JAPAN

October 19—Japan and Russia sign a peace declaration bringing to an end the state of war that has existed for the last 11 years. The treaty does not settle the

problem of the Kurile Islands. Russia recognizes the right of Japan to the tiny Habomai and Shikotan Islands. The declaration also provides for the establishment of diplomatic relations, the repatriation of Japanese prisoners, the relinquishing of reparations from Japan, and Russian support for Japan's application for membership in the United Nations.

MOROCCO

October 7—The United States relinquishes its extraterritorial treaty rights in Morocco; United States Consular Courts will no longer try American citizens in Morocco.

October 8—The Sultan of Morocco insists on the non-interference by foreign powers in Tangier's rule by Morocco. He states that he will consult with foreign powers on the best way to safeguard their economic interests in Tangier.

October 19—The nine-power conference on the abolition of international rule over Tangier agrees on the status of Tangier's civil servants and the compensation to be paid to those who lose their jobs because of the integration of Tangier with Morocco.

October 20—The nine-power conference on the status of Tangier agrees to the end of international rule there. The draft declaration to be submitted to the several governments for their approval permits present radio broadcasting stations to continue their operations until Morocco's monopoly over communications operations can be extended to the Tangier zone.

October 24—Riots in Meknès, Morocco, cause the deaths of 60 persons, among whom are 31 Europeans. These riots are touched off by the French seizure of 5 Algerian rebels en route from Rabat to Tunis under the protection of the Sultan of Morocco. (For further information see FRANCE.)

October 25—Waves of rioting sweep Tunis and Morocco where 9 more are killed in clashes near Meknès as a result of the Algerian arrests.

October 29—International rule of Tangier ends with the final act of the nine-power conference.

NETHERLANDS

October 12—The Netherlands' four-month political crisis ends with the formation of a cabinet headed by Dr. William Drees of the Socialist party. The impasse was a result of the struggle between the two major parties, the Socialists and the Catholic People's party, to win the smaller parties. The new government includes 6 Socialists, 4 Catholic People's party members, 2 members of the anti-Revolutionary party, and 1 Christian Historical Union member.

PANAMA

October 1—Ernesto de la Guardia, Jr., is installed as Panama's new president.

POLAND

October 1—A Poznan Judge, Wacław Zebrowski, denies the request of the defense to hold one large trial for all those who have been arrested for attacking the secret police. The Judge rules that only specific crimes can be tried, without their larger economic, social and political implications.

October 5—The Government announces a number of price reductions on textiles, shoes, appliances and rice. The last is the most important for the Polish personal budget, but it is also the smallest reduction.

October 7—Four new trials scheduled to begin sometime during the next 10 days are postponed.

October 8—The first sentences to come out of the trials of Poznan rioters are light. Sentencing 3 young men to 4 years in prison for the brutal beating and subsequent death of a police officer, Judge Celinski finds the use of the emergency code is unwarranted. Under the emergency code, the penalty for such a crime is 10 years mandatory imprisonment.

October 9—Hilary Minc, Deputy Premier and member of the Politburo of the Polish Communist party and a foe of

Wladyslaw Gomulka, resigns from his post because of ill health. It is believed that the demand for his resignation came from Wladyslaw Gomulka who, it is rumored, will be restored to his position in the Polish Communist party by the Central Committee.

October 10—Without any formal government notice, it appears that the two cases now before the court will end the Poznan riot trials. The fiction that lack of space is not available to continue the trials is no longer being maintained.

October 16—Polish Communist leaders seek the removal of Soviet officers from the Polish Army.

October 20—Wladyslaw Gomulka, ousted in 1948 as a Titoist, is restored to the Polish Communist party's Central Committee. Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist party, and other top Soviet leaders arrive in Warsaw to present demands to the Polish Central Committee that pro-Soviet influences be retained in the leadership of the Polish Communist party. Marshal Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, former Soviet officer who is now Poland's Defense Minister and Commander in Chief, posts troops near the capital. The old Politburo, which resigned so that a fresh start could be made under M. Gomulka, meets with the Russians. Bitter 6-hour-long talks take place between Russian and Polish leaders in an attempt to prevent Poland from breaking away from Russian ties.

Polish and Soviet frontier troops fire at each other as Soviet troops in East Germany are restrained by Polish fire from entering Poland.

October 21—Wladyslaw Gomulka is named First Secretary of the Polish Communist party. The Polish Communist party wins a measure of independence from Soviet intervention when Marshal Rokossovsky, Minister of Defense and former Soviet army hero, is not elected to the new Politburo.

October 22—Soviet army troops in Poland stage maneuvers; two Soviet cruisers are denied permission to enter Danzig Harbor. The Poles report that Russian army maneuvers are to end shortly.

October 24—Wladyslaw Gomulka announces that Soviet troops stationed in Poland will return to their regular bases "within two days."

October 25—The removal of Soviet troops does not include the 3 or 4 Russian divisions moved into Poland from East Germany last weekend.

A crowd of Poles attacking Soviet army installations at Liegnitz is repelled by Polish militia who fire tear gas into the crowd.

October 28—Marshal Rokossovsky returns to the Soviet Union hurriedly after a commission finds proof that he planned a military coup against First Secretary Gomulka. Although Marshal Rokossovsky is said to be on leave, he is not expected to return to his post as Polish Defense Minister.

October 30—The Polish government decides to ask the Soviet Union for its 15 per cent of German reparations payments to the Soviet Union, to which it is entitled and which it never collected.

RUMANIA

October 18—Rumanian and U. S. officials negotiate in Bucharest to settle U. S. claims for war damaged property and property damaged by the Communist regime after the war. Nearly half the claims have been filed by U. S. oil companies with holdings in the Ploesti fields.

October 21—The Rumanian people learn in their newspapers that there is an anti-Soviet campaign being waged in the Polish press; news about armed clashes and ultimatums is not reported.

October 22—The chairman of the Rumanian Chamber of Commerce declares that Rumania wants to expand trade with the U. S.

October 28—The Government appeals to ethnic minorities for "vigilance" against rebellion. Some news of the difficulties in Hungary and Poland has been released. "Counter-revolutionary rebellion" is reported in Hungary and "nationalist demonstrations" in Poland.

SWEDEN

October 13—The Socialists and Agrarians announce that they will continue their coali-

tion for two years, despite areas of disagreement on the subject of higher commodity prices and workers' pensions.

TUNISIA

October 17—Tunisia takes control of her Algerian frontier from French troops, to prevent Algerian-French fighting from spreading to Tunisia.

October 22—Anti-French riots begin in Tunisia.

October 27—Tunisian civilians clash with French troops at five points in Tunisia with casualties reported on both sides. Disorder rises out of the French arrest of five Algerian rebel leaders. (See also Morocco, France, Algeria.)

U.S.S.R., THE

October 1—Beginning January 1, 15 thousand steel workers at Zaporozhe will go on a seven-hour work day.

October 5—The Government orders 14 factories to adopt new wage and output quota systems expected to set a pattern for the first basic wage reform in 33 years.

October 9—The U. S. Embassy announces that the U. S. Government-produced magazine, "Amerika," in Russian, will appear on newsstands in 84 Russian cities October 22; U. S. newsstands will carry copies of the Russian-produced magazine "U.S.S.R." in English.

October 15—Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin asserts that the Soviet Union will not again block Japan's entry into the U.N.

First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan declares that all states including Israel should have equal access to the Suez Canal.

October 19—Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri T. Shepilov says that the Soviet Union "is not considering any such project" as financing the Aswan Dam in Egypt.

October 20—Premier Bulganin proposes to U. S. President Eisenhower that the U. S. and the Soviet Union should agree to ban tests on nuclear bombs.

October 20—Soviet Communist party chief Nikita S. Khrushchev and others return to Moscow after a trip to Poland. No reason for the trip is given in the Russian newspapers. Polish troubles are also ignored.

October 21—Thirteen Soviet Communist officials arrive in Prague "to study party work and life in Czechoslovakia."

October 22—Nikita S. Khrushchev reveals that a new law is being prepared democratizing and altering the functions of Parliament.

October 23—The Government rejects West Germany's suggestions for the reunification of Germany and asks the Bonn government for further specific proposals to guarantee East Europe against future attack.

October 24—*Pravda* reveals that "hostile elements" in the Polish People's Republic are causing a "situation."

October 25—*Pravda* expresses regret for the misunderstanding that has developed because of Bulganin's note to Eisenhower. (See also U. S. Foreign Affairs.)

October 27—The Moscow radio charges that U. S. intelligence services and those of other Western powers were the "initiators" of the Hungarian revolt.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

October 5—The deadline passes for agreements by farmers to remove winter wheat acreage from production; it appears that farmer signings fall short of the Administration acreage goal by a possible five million acres.

October 11—President Eisenhower promises to "use freely every existing program and legal authority to ease the plight" of families in drought areas.

October 18—The Agriculture Department reports that soil bank payments totaling \$38.5 million have been made to farmers in 41 states.

Civil Rights

October 1—Eighteen major airlines agree to a statement affirming a policy of non-discrimination in hiring. Up to this time no Negro pilots, navigators, radio operators or cabin attendants are being employed by any scheduled U. S. passenger airline.

October 15—Louisiana segregates all sports, including spectators as well as participants.

October 24—A Department of Justice official,

Warren Olney 3d, reveals that qualified Negro voters are being removed from the election rolls in at least five states: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and North Carolina.

The Economy

October 5—Appalachian Coal, Inc., informs its customers of the first coal price increases after the new mine wage agreements; a minimum increase of 35¢ is scheduled.

October 25—The Administration reports that the Consumer Price Index reached 117.1 in September, a record level. The President declares that factory workers' take home pay has more than kept up with the rising cost of living.

Foreign Policy

October 15—President Eisenhower decides to authorize continuing economic aid to Yugoslavia, but withholds heavy military equipment "until the situation can be more accurately appraised." Before an October 16 deadline, the President is required by law to decide that Yugoslavia is still maintaining a policy of independence from the Soviet Union; that she is not seeking Communist domination of the world; and that our aid is "in the interest of national security." Otherwise aid to Yugoslavia is to cease. The President rules affirmatively on all three points.

October 16—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles says the U. S. is determined "within constitutional means" to support any victim of Middle East aggression.

October 21—President Eisenhower charges that Soviet Premier Bulganin's letter urging an end to nuclear bomb tests is an interference in the internal political affairs of the U. S. during an election, and is otherwise offensive.

October 22—The Government reports that all types of U. S. foreign aid exceeded five billion dollars in the fiscal year ending June 30, an increase of 6 per cent over the previous year.

October 23—President Eisenhower indicates that he is ready to give aid to Poland and other "freedom loving" satellites if

they "need and want and can profitably use it."

October 24—The Government plans to offer economic aid to Morocco and Tunisia.

October 27—Secretary of State Dulles offers economic aid to Soviet satellites struggling for independence from the Soviet Union. He says that the U. S. has "no ulterior purpose in desiring the independence of the satellite countries."

October 28—President Eisenhower warns Israel against taking any "forceful initiative" as the Israeli government announces mobilization of army reserves.

October 29—The White House announces that the U. S. will take the Israeli invasion of Egypt to a Security Council emergency meeting October 30.

Government

October 8—A three-judge panel of the Federal Court of Appeals holds that when the Federal Power Commission granted the privately-owned Idaho Power Company a 50-year license to build and operate three hydroelectric dams in Hell's Canyon it was not violating the Federal Power Act or the Constitution.

October 9—The Administration begins to investigate John L. Lewis' charges that the T.V.A. is buying non-union coal.

October 12—Olin Chilson of Loveland, Colorado, is appointed Assistant Secretary of the Interior after former Republican Representative Wesley D'Ewart's appointment fails to receive Senate confirmation.

October 14—The Government-owned Panama Line publishes passenger lists dating back to July 1, 1955, showing that 25 congressmen travelled free on the line between September 29, 1955, and October 11, 1956. Thirty-five dependents of congressmen and committee staff members travelled for 25 per cent of the fare during this period.

October 27—The Senate Appropriations Committee reveals that Senate Committees spent \$168,488.70 in foreign counterpart funds to send their members overseas on official business during the 1956 fiscal year.

Labor

October 3—The United Mine Workers rati-

fies a contract providing a package wage increase of 30¢ an hour for soft-coal mine workers.

October 8—The American Labor Party is dissolved.

Military

October 5—Secretary of the Navy Charles S. Thomas overrules the general court martial ruling discharging S/Sgt. Mathew C. McKeon. McKeon's sentence is reduced from nine months to three months; he is reduced to the rank of private; his fine is canceled.

October 8—The Defense Department reveals its decision to let the special draft law for doctors expire next June 30.

Politics

October 1—President Eisenhower charges that the Democrats in Congress were responsible for killing federal aid to school construction.

Adlai Stevenson suggests that federal education expenditures should rise five hundred million dollars to one billion dollars each year for the next 10 years.

October 5—The Census Bureau figures that approximately 102,750,000 citizens will be old enough to vote in the 1956 elections.

The United Mine Workers decides not to support either candidate for President in 1956.

President Eisenhower declares that he does not think the constitutional amendment limiting presidential tenure to two terms is "wholly wise."

President Eisenhower attacks the "verbal confusion" created by Adlai Stevenson on the question of banning nuclear bomb tests.

October 6—Stevenson asserts that the death of Stalin, not the election of Eisenhower, caused the end of the Korean War.

October 9—President Eisenhower charges that Stevenson deludes the public with talk of a "cheap and easy" peace.

October 10—The Republican National Committee reveals that it had \$540,289 on hand October 1; the Democratic National Committee says it was in the red about \$106,000 on October 1.

October 13—Stevenson brings up the issue

of an "aging President" on the eve of Eisenhower's 66th birthday.

October 12—Stevenson makes his proposal for suspending nuclear bomb tests a central issue of the campaign.

October 15—Stevenson calls for an international agreement to stop nuclear bomb tests.

Meeting at Richmond, 2,200 representatives select a ticket for the States' Rights party: T. Coleman Andrews of Virginia, former U. S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is nominated for the Presidency; Thomas H. Werdel of Bakersfield, California, is his running mate.

Estes Kefauver declares that a hydrogen bomb explosion could "right now blow the earth off its axis by 16 degrees. . . ."

October 17—Stevenson charges that Vice-President Richard Nixon is unfit for high office, a "man of many masks."

October 18—Adlai Stevenson suggests replacing the military draft with a professional, highly paid volunteer corps.

October 23—A recount of the ballots cast in Maine's First Congressional District in the September 10 election reveals that Republican Representative Robert Hale is victor with a margin of 124 votes; it is expected that the dispute will be sent to the House of Representatives in Washington for final decision.

October 28—President Eisenhower is pronounced in "excellent health" after an examination at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

October 29—President Eisenhower, speaking in the South, states that the problem of racial equality should be handled mostly on the state and local level.

Supreme Court

October 1—The Supreme Court opens its 166th session, with all nine justices on the bench.

October 8—The Supreme Court issues its list of orders; 360 cases out of more than 800 on the docket deal with communism and subversion.

October 10—The Supreme Court orders a new trial for western Pennsylvania's Communist leader Steve Nelson, and four associates, because of doubt as to the credi-

bility of F.B.I. informant Joseph D. Mazzei.

October 15—Justice Sherman Minton sits with the Court for the last time after seven years of service. He is retiring for reasons of health.

October 16—William Joseph Brennan, Jr., of New Jersey, is sworn in as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the ninetieth man to assume office.

TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT

October 11—Alaska's Democratic party wins in the general elections.

October 9—Because Alaska has not achieved statehood, Alaskan representatives are not recognized officially in Congress.

VIETNAM

October 8—President Ngo Dinh Diem issues orders making it illegal for non-citizens to own businesses in 11 categories, including transport and many retail trades, in a move to eliminate the separate Chinese community within the Republic. Chinese born in Vietnam henceforth are automatically citizens of the Republic; private Chinese high schools must comply with new regulations to ensure Vietnamese control.

October 26—In a celebration of the first anniversary of South Vietnam's independence, the new Constitution is promulgated.

YUGOSLAVIA

October 5—President Tito returns from the

Black Sea conference with Soviet leaders without comment.

October 6—An Italian Communist party delegation arrives in Belgrade to study "Titoism."

October 9—The semi-official news agency *Yugopress* reminds Bulgaria that "real cooperation" between the two countries depends on a long and gradual reconciliation.

October 12—A Foreign Ministry spokesman declares that "nothing has been changed nor could have been changed in the well-known orientation of Yugoslav foreign policy" during the recent talks with the Russians.

It is learned in Washington that the State Department is recommending continuing aid to Yugoslavia.

October 15—Hungarian and Italian party leaders praise President Tito.

October 17—Yugoslavia objects to U. S. President Eisenhower's restrictions on continuing aid to Yugoslavia. (For further information see U. S. Foreign Policy.)

October 23—At the close of a seven-day visit a communiqué issued by the Hungarian and Yugoslav Communists shows complete agreement between Erno Gero, First Secretary of the Hungarian Working People's party and President Tito.

October 24—It is reported in London that President Tito has agreed not to influence Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

October 26—The Yugoslav government officially approves the new regimes in Poland and Hungary.



"... Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their thought has come to this, that the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that the right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression; that henceforth alliance must not be set up against alliance, understanding against understanding, but that there must be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and of mankind. The nations of the world have become each other's neighbors. It is to their interest that they should understand each other."

—Woodrow Wilson, May 27, 1916.

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